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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A study of the selection of party leaders in the 
Congress of the United States can vitally affect the under-
standing of the dynamic nature of that body, Congress has 
selected, in its nearly 200 years of existence, an array of 
individuals as party leaders who have not only been molded by 
institutional restraints and the traditions peculiar to a 
legislative body, but who have likewise affected the character 
of the Congress and have induced, by themselves, dramatic 
changes. Thel'e is a certain unanL'lli ty of agreement that many 
changes, some of which can be credited to the talents of 
specific leaders, have contributed to making it a more viable 
political institution responsive to the needs of the American 
1 
people. 
Of late, many critics of the modern legislative 
process have viewed with alarm the usurpation of legislative 
2 powers by the executive branch. Some attribute this 
phenomenon to the weakness and decentralized leadership roles 
of those who are selected to lead the majority party.3 Still 
others suggest that the make-up of the modern Congress 
precludes any easy solu·bion to ans1-1er the needs of a national 
constituency because Congress and its leaders lack the 
ability to identify and establish national priorities •. 4 
1 
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The above critics are joined by certain members of 
Congress themselves who question the role of party leaders. 
Not all are in agreement as to the extent of the involvement 
of the party leadership at any given time, the degree to 
which leaders act11s.lly influence the outcome of legislation 
nor the nature of their role in maximizing the effectiveness 
of the lawmaking body. 5 Further, there has been no agree-
ment as to what kind of leaders are the most effective for a 
2. 
consistently responsive legislature. But, most students of 
the legislative process agree that the roles of leaders, 
their methods, their character, their ability, and their 
personalities have some effect upon their party's legislative 
policies and goals. 
ifuatever their degree of effectiveness or importance, 
the selection of leaders has traditionally been of keen 
interest to themselves and the public. Only in the last two 
decades, however, has any thorough study been done on the 
selection process itself. Recent studies have attempted to 
discover why certain individuals are chosen above others for 
the formal congressional party leadership positions. Further, 
the effort has been made to find an 
leadership change as well as to the 
order, or pattern, to 
6 
study of style. 
This paper will explore further the process of 
selection of majority party leaders in the United States 
House of Representatives. It <lill seek to show that there 
were certain common denominators that existed among those who 
\~ere selected for leadership positions bet\ieen 1962 and 1976, 
c::: __ _ 
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and that these common denominators Here not present in those 
individuals Hho challenged the leaders and lost. Additionally, 
it will be a1•gued that those certain qualHies were parti-
cularly important to the style of leadership during that 
period, and that their importance to that style allowed the 
development of an institutionalization of the selection 
process during that period • 
. THE PROBLEM 
Between 1962 and 1976 the House of Representatives 
had a collegial style of majority party leadership.? This 
meant that leadership was dispersed among several leaders 
instead of being concentrated in the per•son of a single, 
poHerful leader.8 Because it is necessary in leadership of 
this kind for there to be loyal cooperation among those 
.,.,........., .. ::t.~.,:.-1" .... ;~.,A. 
leaders, the question arises as to wha·i; kinds of individuals, 
what qualities they possessed, what qualifications they had, 
that enabled them to be selected for majority party formal 
leadership positions within this style. Further, what 
qualities or characteristics did those House members have 
who campaigned for leadership positions but were unsuccessful? 
Once these differences have been establi~hed, it 
becomes necessary to analyze which of those qualifications 
were ultimately critical in the final leadership selection. 
Additionally, were the leaders who were chosen 11 establishment 11 
members, whose tendencies led them toward approving tradi-
tional leadership practices, or we1•e 11 change-oriented11 
c.: 
----
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membel'S selected Hho Here interested in abandoning the 
selection processes of earlier decades? 
Finally, Here the requirements of the collegial 
style such that only certain <J,Ltalifications for leaders Here 
l.j. 
suitable for the perpetuation of that style? If so, 1-1as this ,;__c_-~~ 
evidence of a groHing institutionalization? 
There will be three hypotheses that Hill be tested 
in this research paper in order to establish some kind of 
pattern in the leadership selec·Gion process. The first 
hypothesis that will be examined concerns the qualifications 
of those .vho won majority party leadership positions within 
the time period indicated above. This hypothesis is: If a 
member of the House of Representatives possessed sufficient 
seniority, was a loyal party member, voted with his party more 
often than the average party member, was a protege of a 
senior party member, had participated in numerous House 
activities, had served on important committees, was a 
moderate, had an acceptable personality, had served in the 
whip organization, he was eligible for party leadership. 
Second, those candidates who 111ere defeated in their 
efforts to be selected for par·t;y leadership positions failed 
because they lacked certain critical qualifications that v1ere 
necossary for the collegial style. 
Third, it 1-1as the nature of the collegial style, 
during this period, vlhich created and allowed institutional-
ization of the selection process. This institutionalization 
grEn~ because of the requirements of the collegial style 
itself. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
'rhis study has a basically his·~orical perspective. 
Because it has not been possible to acquire all of the 
necessary information from direct observation, the historical 
approach has been the only feasible way a proper analysis of 
such a subject could be made. It has been necessary, for the 
most part, to 1•ely on the basic research of scholars who 
have studied various aspects of congressional leadership. 
The research of these scholars. is supplemented, however, by 
the limited observations in personal encounters while 
visiting the House of Representatives, Congressman John J. 
McFall, and numerous other Representatives. The information 
acquired therein will be used largely to supplement historical 
research since the time spent in Washington D.C. (one week) 
was insufficient for the accumulation of large quantities of 
accurate data. The basic merit of such a visit was in the 
area of general 11 impressions" that were acquired which 
contributed many valuable insights. 
The information for this study has come from the 
folloHing sources: 
1. General historical studies of the Congress of 
the United States. 
2. Current periodicals and books related speci-
fically to the area of congressional leadership. 
3. Biographical sketches of rr..ajori ty party leaders 
>=-----------
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and potential leaders. 
L~. Personal interviews. 
5. Congressional Quarterly studies relating to 
party voting records. 
6. Newspapers and news magazines. 
Research methods have consisted of comparing those 
chal•acteris-t;ics of the members chosen for leadership 
6 
positions with ·chose who challenged these leaders in terms of 
the sa~e criteria or qualifications. These criteria for 
selection of leaders were compiled from three sources: 
(1) lists compiled by other researchers; (2) analyses of the 
background and per•sonalities of those \-Jho have successfully 
acquired leadership positions; (3) lists of common charac-
teristics of those who have been selected as congressional 
party leaders. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Collegial Style 
The term, collegial style, denotes the style of 
leadership used during the period of this study (1962-1976). 
Randall R:l.pley used the term 1-1hen he suggested various 
pa·l;terns of leadership style that have been evident in the 
United States House of Representatives.9 Ripley indicates 
thaij it; is generally created purposely when the single-leader 
style cannot be duplicated because of the lack of a parti-
culs.rly strong or charismatic leader. The collegial style 
.ts chare.c'ter•ized by a cooperative effort among the three top 
. 
_· 
-
. 
-·-----·~-
[ 
l-, 
"'--"---
---
majority party leaders to discuss and plan strategy for the 
implementation of the party program. 10 Ripley says, "From 
1962 until 1967, the Democrats ha'le relied on three princi-
pal leaders with an additional nineteen members important in 
the v1hip organlzation.11 
Insti tutionaliza·t;~ 
The use of the term 11insti tutionalization11 in this 
paper will refer to the relative predictability by which 
leaders are selected for formal leadership positions. This 
is in keeping with the formal definition of' the term which 
refers to an emphasis on organization above all other 
factors.12 
Establishment 
---~ 
The term establishment, is used in reference to 
7 
those members of the House who are considered to be satisfied 
with the status-quo as pertains to the present working-rules 
of the House, This term is used in opposition to those 
members conside~ed 11 change-oriented11 who would prefer 
reforms and even radical alteration of the working-rules. 
"Exclusive11 and "semi-exclusive" Committe~ 
• There is evidence that the standing conwittees of 
the House do not enjoy equal prestige and therefore some are 
considered more important than others. 13 Thus, the terms, 
11 exclusive 11 and 11 semi-exclusive 11 refer to those committees 
that are considered the most important, Those committees 
po--
~--=-=· __ =_=_=_ 
constituting the first group are: Rules, Appropriations, 
and Hays and !>leans; the second group is made up of Armed 
Services, Judiciru•y, Agriculture, Inters tate and Foreign 
Commerce,, Foreign Affairs, and Government Oper•ation. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the problem, that of determining 
qualifications of leaders within the collegial style, should 
not only lead to a better idea of the types of individuals 
chosen, but it also will provide insight into the person-
ality and character of the Congress of the last t\-10 decades, 
The ru1alysis will reflect the ways in which leadership 
selec·tion affects the dynamic nature of Congress. 
• 
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FOOTNOTES 
Chapter l 
l. Even though the characteristic of a "viable" legislative 
body may not have been determined as yet, ·today 1 s 
Congress appears to be more subdued, at least. Depending 
on one's sense of humor, it is interesting to note here 
a description of a scene which took place in an early 
Congress and one which even the severist critics of 
present day congressional sessions would have to admit as 
being unlikely to occur. This is taken from DeAlva 
Alexander's Histor and Procedure of the House of 
ReY.resentatives. oston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 
pp. 111-112. 
"When Matthew Lyon, of Kentucky, spat in his face, Roger 
Friswold (of Connecticut), a member from 1795 to 1805, 
stiffened his arm to strike, but remembering where he was, 
he cooly wiped his cheek. But after the House, its vote 
failed to expel Lyon, he 'beat him with great violence•, 
says a contemporary chronicle, 'using a strong walking 
stick'"· Other sources indicate that this incident, 
not unusual, was typical of other episodes which 
occurred with alarming frequency. 
2. This was clearly the theme of the book by Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. The Imferial Presidency. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19 3). 
4· 
David B. Truman, in the concluding chapter of Congress 
and America's Future. (Englet~ood Cliffs, N. J.: -
Prentice-Hall, 1965) cites the lack of centralized 
leadership as one of the great weaknesses of the Congress. 
Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the 
Twentieth Century", in David B. T1•uman 1 s, Congress an.d 
America's Future,.speaks of the diversity of constiuencies 
re-:pr6sented in Congress at a time t;hen national priori ties 
are the greatest in our history, and o.f the irx•econcili-
bility of these two forces unless drastic readjustments 
are made. The average congressman, says Huntington, is 
just too busy ansv1ering the needs of hia own district to 
be able to concentrate on larger national issues and 
policies that need immediate and long range solutions. , 
9 
-----
10 
5. It is intel'e.stlng that; in a. study of party leader 
influence on individual Congressman, John W, Kingdon, in 
Copgyessment_s Voting Hecords, (New York: Harper & How, 
1'173 claims that congressmen are not influenced by 
party leadex>s to the extent that we might believe, 'rhat 
is, in the process of interviewing individual members, 
Kingdon asserts that they feel little pressure or 
inclination to vote as prescribed by congressional party 
leader. In question here, however, would be the extent 
to t-Jhich members might actually reveal the real truth to 
an interviewer. No doubt; there is certainly some merit 
to the sugges·tion that a member would like to pol'tray an 
image to any intervievJer that he is 11his own ma.'1. 11 • The 
research techniques of such a study vJould be critical in 
order to arrive at any real answers to a subject such as 
this. 
6. The establishment of "order" as referred to here was the 
result of the effort of Randall Ripley. That is to say, 
it i.s Ripley 1 s wor'k on this categorization of patterns of 
change and style that originally inspired the \vork for 
t;his thesis, Other writers have produced voluminous 
material on congressional party leaders but the establish" 
ment of a histOl'ica1. order certainly has to be credi·ted 
to Ripley. Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of 
)l~~E_entat~. (Ne;J York: The Brookings Institution, 
l'Jb II • . 
7. The definition of the term "collegial style" appears in 
the last part of this chapter under Definition of Terms. 
8. Perhaps the most extensive work done to date on the types 
of i.ndividuals chosen for leadership positions has been 
done by Robert L. Peabody in Leadership in Congress, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19'76) • Peabody goes far 
beyond describing the type of individual chosen but 
r•ather describes the techniques used· and the circum-
s·tances in Hhich they 1'ere chosen, He was aided in this 
by extensive research of certain leadership contest by 
Ne.lson Polsby in his "Two Strategies of Influence: 
Choosing a i"lajori ty I.eader, 196211 , which Peabody has 
included in the book just cited, 
9. Because the Democratic Party has been the majority 
pa1•ty fox• all but two Congresses during this period, 
th:l.s study will concex•n itself only with Democratic party 
leaders j.n the House. 
10. Ripley' o work, vlhich ca1•ries the identification of the 
typos and styles of majority party leadership periods, 
says that the h:tstory of the House of Representatives 
shows that the styles have been {1) single-member 
loadePshiJ? (either by the Spee.ker or the Hajori ty 
Leader), \2) c~ollegial, (3) Presidential leadership. 
i-' 
11 
Any review of leadership in the House leaves little 
doubt that for purposes of study at least, categorical 
typing of leadership periods, even if challenged histox•i-
cally (is quite effective) and is moreover, helpful to 
subsequent studies and is probably as accUl'ate as such a 
thing can be. Ripley, pp. 82-83. 
11. Ripley, Ibid,, P• 85. 
12. 
13. 
lfebster' s Collegiate Dictionar;z, (Springfield, l'lass: 
G & c Merrirua co.) 1965. 
Neil l'lacNeil, ~e of Democracy, (Ne>oJ York: David l'lcKay 
Co, 1963), p. 40b. 
/ 
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Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF MAJORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP POSITIONS 
Before the criteria for the selection process can be 
established, it is important to understand the functions of 
the formal leadership positions in a historical context. It 
must be understood just what the formal party leaders do and 
how they have come to function in the capacities that they 
perform today. The three formal positions, the Speaker, the 
majority leader, and the majority whip, have changed in both 
qualification and substance, and their roles today bear only 
slight resemblance to their earlier roles in history. 
The 
The only constitutionally authorized leadership 
position in the House of Representatives is the Speaker. 
other two leadership positions, not authorized nor even 
mentioned in the Constitution, are strictly party positions 
and for that reason do not have the dual nature that is 
imposed on the Speaker. The Constitution did not stipulate 
in detail the nature of the role of the Speaker. It only 
referred to his being the presiding officer of the House. He 
is that to this day and in so being has had power of immense 
proportions from time to time, the degree depending on the 
time period he has served, and the nature of his personal and 
12 
~' 
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-----
~------
political skills. Often, that office has taken on the 
coloration of its occupant. 
Even though the Speaker's position was created by 
the Constitution, he derives his power and duties largely 
13 
from tradition, the rules of the House, and parliamentary law. 
He also possesses many informal pOivers which not only stem 
from his role in presiding over House sessions, putting 
questions, recognizing members on the floor, but which result 
from his mere contact with many House members and his 
extensive lmowledge of the business of ·che House. 
Traditionally the Speaker, having been chosen from 
the majority party has not only been in charge of the general 
proceedings of the House, but also has been considered 
largely responsible for the legislative output of his party's 
interests. 1 The majority of the members of the House have 
looked to him for leadership in achieving cohesion and 
accomplishing their legislative goals. It is obvious that 
this dual role Hhich the Speaker holds puts him in a position 
of being the centralizing force around which his allies can 
rally, 
The extent of his influence has been limited from 
time to time according to the formal powers which he has 
possessed, For example, when Joseph Cannon was Speaker of 
the House of Representatives from 1903-1911, he held enormous 
formal poHel'S which includect being able to appoint all 
committee members and their chairmen, which by itself 
constituted power of tmlimited direction and scope. 2 
f-:i 
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Sam Rayburn, on the othe1• hand, (who served as 
Speaker from 19L~0-1961) 1 did not have the fo1•mal poHers that 
Cannon had, yet ruled with considerable authority and power,3 
His source of power came prior to his selection as Speaker 
when he became familiar with nearly all the personalities and 
knew 1·1ell hoH to use friendship to achieve his ends.. Even 
though he did not havG many rules that Cannon had been able 
to use, vii th the use of intuition based on such qualities as 
personal friendships, favors owed, seniority, trust, and 
persuasion, his was pm~er developed largely through the use 
of these latter qualities, 
\Vith extensive personal influence a person as 
influential as the Speaker may directly or indirectly 
ir:•fluence the committee which is charged Hi th the selection 
of bhe standing committees. Even after the Speaker's 
influence <las roduced by the "Revolt of 191011 ,4 Speaker 
Nicholas Longworth had four unreliable incumbent Republicans 
on the Rules Committee replaced with his own choices, In 
similar fashion, Rayburn at one time made sure that the 
Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee were favorable to 
his stand on such things as reciprocal trade and the issue of 
the o:i.J. depletion all01~ance.5 As a matter of fact, he t<as 
known to have interfered with the make-up of certain other 
committ;ees from time to time. And so, without the strong 
formal powers once ava:i.lable to the Speaker, Rayburn became 
pm·Jerful through different methods than those used by Joe 
6 Cannon. 
F--
~ 
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In the history of the Speakership 1 Cannon can be 
said to represent an end of an era when the Speaker had 
enormous formal power. Today, those powers are limited by 
es·l;ablished and voluminous precedents and rules as J}ell as 
limited p01~er in r-e1r1arding members by choosing them for 
15 
special committees. Rayburn represents the modern concept of 
the use of power through personal friendship and persuasion 
and based on past political favors plus his own skill and 
7 knowledge. This type of leadership has extended into what 
is nm>~ the collegial s·tyle by which the po11ers of the Speaker 
are more likely to be shared or dispersed among the three 
formal party .leaders. 
It is possible that Rayburn's style has set a 
precedent for the immediate past and for some years to come. 
This cannot necessarily be said of his.methods, By style it 
is mee.nt here that he used the pm•ers of his personality 
rather than the rules of the House. By method is meant that 
he operated almost completely alone, depending on his own 
personal knm·Jledge of other as 1-1ell as depending on his ovm 
stature to secure loyalty to his causes. Both Cannon and 
Rayburn obviously had personalities that made leade1•ship a 
personal thing even though both seemed to have had personal 
lieutenants who were extremely loyal and who devoted them-
selves to carrying out the l·Jishes of the Speaker. 
There is evidence that a great vacuum was created 
. . 8 
when Speaker Rayburn died. The era of the single-leader 
style of leadership came to a."l end and has not yet reappeared. 
">=< 
~~ 
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It is significant to note that when Cannon stepped down as 
Speaker of the House, his successor, Cha~p Clark, while 
operating with greatly reduced rules, called upon t;he help of 
t;he majority leader to a greater extent as did Rayburn's 
successor, John HcCormack of Massachusetts. This is another 
indication oi' a vacuUlll being c:('eated when a strong leader 
dies or steps down. 
\\'hen Speaker· McCormack became the pt•esiding officer 
of the House of Representatives on the death of Raybu.vn, he 
indicated that he intended to share his responsibilities 
with the other two leaders.9 This he apparently did and 
this leads into a discussion of the role of the majority 
leader. 
Hajority Lead'E.: 
The majority leader is a leadership position that 
has only had formal designation since the turn of the 
century. 10 
Prior to that time the spokesman for the majority 
party was anyone who seemed t-o possess leadership qualities 
and who operated on the floor accordingly. It •~as not 
unusual for each piece of legislation to have its own spokes-
man, especially if that person was in particular favor 1-1ith 
11 the Speaker. Jp.Jnes S. YoLmg says in The ~\_ngton. 
.C;!,OEilll1tmi ty, 
Pru•ty members selected no leaders, designated no 
functionaries to speak in their b:ehalf or to carry 
legislative -!;ask assignments. The pa:r.ty had no whips, 
no senim:oi ty leaders. There we:r•e no committees on 
conlllli ttees, no steering committees, no policy 
c01mnittees: none of the organizational apparatus that 
marks the twentieth century congressional parties ••• 
there were a number of party leaders in the House 
but no fixed majority leader.l2 · 
17 
Evidence has it then, that there were several de 
facto leaders until the last part of the 19th centL1ry when 
the chairman of \·lays and Means Committee began to receive the 
formal designation as party leader. Finally, in 1919 the 
position majority leader became a full t;ime posi tion.13 
In the history of the House of Representatives as 1~e 
have seen, the majority floor leaders have been many things 
and their power has varied from time to time. Immediately 
following the "Revolt of 1910 11 when the Speaker 11as stripped 
of much formal power, many of the former duties of the 
Speaker fell to the majority leader. For example, when Cla"t"k 
was elected Speaker in 1911 following Cannon, the floor 
leader and party caucus gained control of the Rules Committee 
as well as exercising much control over other major committees 
of the House. Oscar Underwood, the newly elected floor 
leader under Clark, became the real leadel' of the House, and 
it is said that he could "ask and get recognition at any time 
to make motions and restrict debate or preclude amendments 
or both. 1114 
Today, the majority leader, a technically unofficial 
officer of the House, is selected by the Speaker or the 
party caucus and need not be confirmed by the House itself. 
O<ling no allegiance to a constitutionally prescribed position, 
he can proceed wi·th the over-all management of his party's 
~-----
-----
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program on tho floor of the House. He has charge of the 
fOl'mal agenda of' the House as well as being his party's chief 
spokesman on the floor. The majority leader, in being in 
charge o.f the House agenda, must develop a system for 
legisla·tive action on the floor so that all important 
legislatj_on can be considered before time runs out in a 
given session. By consulting with various committee chair-
men he can plan an adequate and orderly time-table so that 
major legislation may be disposed of. Even though he may 
delegate the responsibility to other party leaders, the 
majority leader also has the responsibility of keeping all 
House members, both majority and minority, informed of the 
/ 
coming legislative program, usually announcing it weekly. 
The majority leader, although his knm~ledge of 
rules must be thorough, is not able to use the rules to 
achieve h:ts legislative goals although he can be very effec-
tiva in giving tangible ret~ard to party members through his 
influence wit.h the Speaker. 1.5 Perhaps his greatest power 
lies in the area of communication and "psychological 
16 prefermentn. Because his good will is soug):l.t by most party 
members, the use of this psychological preferment may be his 
greatest; resource. 
The majority leader generally works in three broad 
areas of policy making, according to Robert L. peabody. He 
lists the three areas as being: (1) internal organization, 
vJhich includes the supervision of his own staff and relation-
ships with the minority party, (2) legislative strategy, the 
::::; 
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formulation and implementation of policy, and ( 3) external 
coordination, which involves relationships with the lfaite 
House, the pa~ty, the interest groups, the media, etc. 17 
It is appropriate to say that if the judgment of 
Peabody is correct in listing the above categories as being 
within the scope of the majority leader, then he must 
possess qualities befitting those of an ambassador as well 
as those of a skilled House technician~ As Clark declared 
after having served as floor leader, the majority leader 
"must possess tact, patience, firmness, ability, courage, 
19 
quickness of thought and knowledge of the rules and practices 
18 
of the House." 
If the majority leader is to be charged with all of 
these r•esponsibilities, then the need for an effect;ive 
majority whip can easily be seen. 
Majority lilhi£ 
The majority whip is the newest party leadership 
position, having been formally established at the end of the 
19th century. 19 The basic job of the whip has remained 
unchanged although the methods have modified from time to 
time. Essentially, the whip is to assist the Speaker and 
majority leader who have appointed him (l•ith the concurrence 
of the par·ty caucus) in informing party members of the 'Hishes 
of the leadership and, likewise, in informing the leadership 
of the cm•rent feel:l.ng of the party member's. This makes it 
necessary that the whip maintain close ties t•ith House 
members so that an accurate appraisal of their attitudes may 
·-~ 
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20 be related to the Speakel? e.nd majority leader. 
20 
In order to ins·till a certain degree of accuracy in 
the above mentioned functions, the whip, prior to consi~ 
deration of important legislation, polls his party's members 
in an effort to determine their vieJoJs. Generally these 
"whip counts 11 , taken at the request of the Speaker .and 
majority leader, include specific questions on bills that 
are to be considered. 21 This tells the party leadership if 
proposed legislation is acceptable or unacceptable to most 
party members. Additionally, possible attendance on the 
.• 
floor for certain legislative measures may be predicted so 
that the leadership may decide the most propitious time for 
House conside1•ation. vJhen attendance is needed, especially 
in order that a favored bill be assured of passage, the 
Hhip's office telephones each member to make sure he attends. 
In his role as the party 1 s information officer, the 
whip distributes at the end of each week that Congress is in 
session a 11 \\l'.nip Notice11 which provides all majority party 
members i1ith a list of bills to be considered the following 
week. A recent addition to the information packet members 
receive is the 11\\ll:lip Advisory11 which provides summaries of 
all major bills and amendments to be considered on the floor, 
thus enabling busy members to become acquainted with new 
measures almost at a glance. These advisories are generally 
prepared by the whip office after consultation with the 
committee from which the bill originated.22 
-~~ 
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Because of the extensive amount of administrative 
detail involved as well as the numbers of contacts to be 
made, the Office of Majority vJhip has expanded to include a 
chief deputy whip, three deputy whips, and tvJenty zone whips. 
These assistant whips, along with a special assistant to the 
whip, secretaries, writers, and researchers comprise a large 
staff which represents a sizeable increase in the past fifty 
years. 
wbile Rayburn apparently did not make great use of 
the party whip organization, :HcCormack and Carl Albert saw 
the whip's office as a tool to gather necessary information 
regarding the moods of House members and to generally serve 
as intermediary between the leadership and the members.23 
Because he is still appointed by the majority leader, in 
consultation with the Speaker, the whip obviously serves 
those two leaders and the importance of his position depends 
on the needs of those leaders. 
Since 1962 the whip has taken on greater importance 
and has become useful to the other leaders as they plan their 
strategy.24 For example, extensive use of the vlhip Poll since 
1962 makes it evident that the leaders rely on the v1hip as 
the 11 eyes and ears" of the leadership and they may plan their 
strategy on the will of the House membel'S based on the 
information gathered by the whip organization. The Vlhip Poll1 
which is usually taken after a bill has been reported out of 
committee and before it is scheduled fo.r floor action, is 
generally a fairly accurate story of ho1~ House majority 
~ 
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members t"ill vote on a given bill. Of the ten polls taken 
in 1963, the whip organization was correct ninety per cent of 
the time in ascertaining how each member would vote. On 
occasion, leaders 1-1ere surprised at the outcome of certain 
members' vo·i;es, but in general, the polls were accurate. 
In order to reduce the number of surprises, i·l; is necessary 
for the Hhip orgardzation to become acquainted tvith the 
reliability of certain members in their responses to these 
polls. 
The old tradition, in fact, the original duty of 
the whip organization, that of sounding out members and 
rounding up votes for bills that are urged by the leadership, 
continues to be a:n important Hhip function. By learning 
-v~hat the attendance each day will be, the whips can advise 
the majority leader of the most propitious time to schedule 
a bill for vote and can also work on advising absent members 
of the import;ance of their presence a·b a given time. The 
vlhip t s office then helps to produce high voter turnout which 
is of critical importance to the leadership. Unless the 
Speaker or majority leader is of the sort 1·1ho is able to 
kno1-1 himself (as cel'tain previous Speakers have) what the 
response to certain legislation will be, it is critical that 
he rely on the information gathered by the whip and work 
closely vJith him. 
'I'he extensive use of the whip organization in the 
collegial style is borne out by the increase in size and 
professionalism of the staff that occurred betHeen 1972 ar1d 
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1976. That office then had a full time administrative 
assistant with long prior staff experience in the executive 
branch along with three or four staff assistants who worked 
full time gathering information from cmnmittees for the 
digest of legislation for the Whip Advisories published each 
week. 
In general it can probably be said that the duties 
of the whip have not changed over the years bu-G the methods 
by which he performs these duties have changed depending on 
the person holding the office at any given time. Indications 
are that the whip organization is utilized to a greater 
extent under the present collegial style of leadership. 
With each leadership position described and placed 
in historical context, the question a.:t·ises as to ho-v1 and in 
what v1ay they function as a group. If it is the leaders t 
responsibility to see that their party's legislative policie~ 
are acted upon, it follows that they must be concerned with 
their own internal organization as well as their relationship 
with the opposite party. Additionally, they must plan 
legislative strategy in both policy formation and implemen-
tation, coordinating these plans with the President and the 
executive branch, as well as the electorate. It is obvious 
that a great deal of ground work must be done before 
schedules are made, and before the proper time for a bill to 
be considered. It is l:Jere that the individual functions of the 
party leaders are coordinated to achieve the desired results. 
~---
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\·/hen Jolm HcCormack became Speaker in 1962 and after 
his announcement that he would lead with the help of the 
majority leader and whip, the three party leaders began to 
meet regularly to discuss the strategy that was being advanced 
by the committees. At t:i.J:nes they met daily, but weekly 
meetings bec~ae a regular habit so that communication and 
information sharing might enhance the leadership effort.25 
The three formal congressional party leadership roles 
have changed during the long history of the House of 
Representatives. These roles have often been a reflection 
of the type of personality of the Speaker, who largely seems 
to determine the mode and style of leadership. He may, at 
his mm discretion, choose to use the other two leaders in 
any capacity that; he wishes. In general, during the collegial 
pei'iod from 1962 to 1976, the majority leader and especially 
the <vh5_p seemed to increase the function of their position 
in order to enhance the style of leadership chosen by the 
Speaker. 
R;_;_ __ ~ - --- -~ 
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NOTES 
Chapter 2 
Henry Clay seems to have been the first Speaker to fully 
realize the dual nature of the Speaker 1 s role. He saw 
that Hhile the Founding Fathers intended the Speaker to 
be the presiding officer of the House, the Speakership 
could also be used as the position of greatest influence 
in promoting the party's legislative program. Neil 
Iv!acN ei 1, Forge of Democracy, (David 1'1cKay Co,, Inc, 
New York 1963), PP• 70-71. 
Cannon operated under the "Reed Rules" which allowed the 
Speaker to disregard all motions and appeals that he 
considered designed to delay proper transaction of the 
business of the House. Additionally, a simple majority 
rather than a tVJo-thirds vote could adopt a special 
order prescribing the order of business on the floor and 
the ma1mer and length of debate on a particular bill, 
George Rothwell Brown, The Leader~hip of C~n~;ess, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Hel'l'ill Co., 1922} p. l o, Addi-
tionally, Cannon was known to have waited until he 
accomplished his legislative goals to appoint members to 
committees, thus having something to threaten them with 
or hold over their heads, Further, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the Rules Committee he could determine what 
business the House was to consider, and on the floor used 
his parliamentary powers to recognize members and to 
decide what matters were to come before the House, 
HacNeill, Ibid., P• 59. 
Randall Rifley, Party Leaders in the House of Represen-
tatives. New Y01•k: The Brookings Insti tu. tion, 19b"{'J. [i: 16. 
The "Revolt of 1910 11 was the result of the House 
rebelling against the autocratic rule of Cannon. It 
culminated in the Norris Resolut;ion which stripped many 
of the Speaker 1 s formal powers. JYiacNeill, Ibid., 
pp. 53-5.5. . . . . 
Richard Bolling;~ House Out of Order, (New Yoi•k: E. P. 
Dutton Co, 1965J, p. 77. · Bolling says that today the 
fullest pcvJer lies in the personal influence of the 
occupant of the Speakership. 
25 
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6, Ripley, P• 22. 
7. Bolling, Ibid., p. 66. Rayburn apparently disliked 
s. 
using pal'ty machinery to accomplish his goals, but rather 
preferred the personal contact with individuals. His 
dislike of institutional forms, such as the party caucus 
and steering co11nnittee was evident. Again, he preferred 
to work wi·bh close friends in his appeals for their 
support. This fact is repeated in other books and 
biographies of Rayburn, 
Robert Peabody, LeadershijP in Congress, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co. 19'T6)-;-p. i-.--- -
9, Ripley, p. 102, · Ripley says that when McCormack beca111e 
Speaker he purposely created a collegial leadership 
situation in the Democratic Party. He says that HcCormack 
was fully aware of the vacuum which existed due to the 
death of Rayburn and one which he could not fill 
immediately if ever. 
10. Ripley, Ibid., p. 102, 
11. 
12. 
Ibtd., p. 198. 
James S. Young, ~h.e 't[ashi.ng_};on Coll'f~un~lS00-1828, 
(Ne>·J York, Columbia University Press, 1966), p. !)"b; 
13. Nelson l'olsby, "Institutionalization of the United 
States House of Representatives", American Political 
Scie_E,£e Review, LXII (March, 1968)-;-p:-157. 
George B. GalloHay, H:l.stor:z:. _of the House of Rep,Eesen-
tatives, (Washington D. c.: U, s. Government Printing 
Office, 1965), P• 98, 
15. Ripley, P• 37. 
16. Peabody, pp. 33-34· 
rr. 
18. 
Champ Clark, My Quarter Century in American Politics, 
Vol. II. (New York: Harper Bros., 1920), p. 337. 
11The History and Operation of the House Hajori ty lfuip 
Orgauizationn, Hou~e Docum':'!.nt No. 9)_-126, \ Vlashington 
D. C.: U. S, Government Print:i:rigOffice, 1973). 
19. Randall Ripley, "The Party vfui.p Orgenization in the 
United States House of Representatives", in Nelson Polsby 
end Robert Peabody, (eds.) New Pers.J2!3ctives 0!,1 the House 
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21. Ibid., p. 280, 
22. In Pebruary, 19'74 during a one week's visit to Washington 
D. C., the writer had occasion to speak on the telephone 
vlith Nr. D. B. Hardeman, a retired congressional aide 
1'1ho had served many years on Capitol Hill in several 
capacities, (One time aide to Sam Rayburn, and adminis-
trative assistant to JY!ajority Whip Hale Boggs vJere two 
of his positions), He was especially informative and 
graciously gave impressions as well as his opinions on 
changes in House leadership during that time, It was 
through conversation with him that this particular 
information was obtained. 
23. The information that follovJs regarding the whip was given 
to the writer by Irv Sprague, administrative assistant 
to Rep, John HcFall during this same visit to vlashington, 
as well as by Mr, i1cFall himself. Both were generous in 
the information that they relayed, most of it consisting 
of answers to specific questions regarding the basic 
role and duties of the whip. Excerpts from conversations 
with both men will be referred to from time to time 
throughout this paper as well as with certain other aides 
that .vere extremely helpful. / 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
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Chapter 3 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTY LEADERS 
In order to determine what characteristics or 
qualifications were present in those who attained majority 
party leadership positions during the time period, 1962-1976, 
it is necessary to exaniine those requirements 11hich have been 
set forth by earlier research as criteria for selection, and 
to pursue any other qualities that may be evident in an 
examination of these leaders. In so doing, a list of "common 
denominato.rs" can be gathered and later compared with those 
individuals ;Jho challenged these leaders and lost. If it 
can be determined that the consistent lack of certain 
qualities resulted in defeat, then it is possible to isolate 
those qualities that were characteris·i>ic of the win."lers and 
establish them as being necessary for selection. 
Seniority 
The most conspicuous reqLtirem~nt 
leadersh:!.p position has been seniority.1 
for selection to a 
So absolute has 
been this Ch~·acteristic that its presence has been evident 
as far back as the early days of the 20th century. AHhough 
this study does not cover these years, it is significant to 
note, for emphasis, that from 1903 tmtil the time that 
J"icGormack was elected Speaker in 1962, the average number of 
28 
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years served before the individual's selection as Speaker was 
24 years, 1'\vO Speakers, David Henderson of I O\va and Champ 
Clark of' Nissouri, served the least amount of time prior to 
selection, that being 16 years, and John McCormack served 
the most, 32 years.2 
The presence of seniority as a factor in the selec-
tion of the Speaker has continued since 1962. Speakers 
McCormack, Albert, and_ 0 1Neill served an average of 27 yes~s 
prior to their selection. Had Hale Boggs, elected majority 
leader in 1970, succeeded Albel't as Speaker (his accidental 
death prevented this) the seniority pattern .vould not have 
changed since Boggs had 24 years of service when elected 
majority leader. The number of years prior to becoming 
Speaker has actually increased during the 1962-1976 period. 
Seniority has also been the most obvious character-
istic of those elected majority leader.3 Again, for emphasis, 
1~e find that majority leaders since 1911 have served on the 
average of 18 years in the House before their selection to 
this position. (John McCormack actually served the least 
time, 12 years, before becoming majority leader, but waited 
the longest time of any leader before becoming Speaker.) 
Since 1962, the average time before becoming majority leader 
has been 20 years, 
The position of majority whip is another example of 
seniority as a factor in the selection process,4 An 
appointed leader, the whip has served at least 8 years in 
the House before selection and the average seniority for this 
c:-----
-- -- -----
position since 1911 has been 14 years. Since 1962, the 
average time before becoming whip has been 16 years. 
The fact that all of the leaders chosen since 1962 
have accumulated significan·~ seniority does not mean that 
they were, in fact, the most senior members of their party 
in the House, and that they were selected on this basis. 
30 
The fact that there were others with similar or more seniority 
l'SJ.1.kings shows that seniority is not the sole criterion for 
selection. vlhat these facts do show, however, is that no 
leader attained his position without serving many years in 
the House of Representatives before becoming a leader. There-
fore, seniority, as a qualification for leadership positions, 
is a definite factor in the selection process. 
Party Loyalty_ 
Most research lists strong party loyalty as a 
necessary qualification for leadership selection. This is a 
general thesis which is examined and supported by research 
conducted by both Truman and Hinckley in their studies of 
leadership.> The importance of this characteristic is not 
without a certain amount of logic since it would seem 
reasonable that a lack of loyalty would hardly be rewarded in 
the selection process. It would be unlikely that a leader 
who is not a party regular, in terms of voting behavior, 
Hould v10rk actively to promote his party 1 s program, nor would 
he be as apt to gain the confidence of his party's leaders. 
The degree to ~Jhich a majority party member is loyal 
to his party and votes ~~ith the dominant vling of that party 
r=;--------
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6 
can be measured by party unity scores. These scores shoH 
the percentage of time, on a given number of roll call votes, 
that an individual member has voted with the majority or the 
dominant wing of his party. 
The party unity scores shmm in Table 1 are ·those 
of Albert, Boggs, O'Neill and McFall, all selected party 
leaders during the 1962-1971+ time frame. As the Table 
indicates, the scores shown begin with ·the 88th Congress 
(1963-64) and go through the 93rd Congress (1973-74). These 
scores are composite scores, based on an average of the two 
terms that compose an individual Congressional session. 
The Table shows the average party unity scores of 
majority party (Democratic) members. It is against these 
scores that the party leaders can be compared in order to 
establish the degree of their loyalty. Looking at these 
ave1•ages, it can be seen that all four of the p·arty leaders 
voted more often with the majority of the party than the 
average party member. There aJ:'e no exceptions to this fact. 
For example, in all but one congressional session, Thomas 
P. O'Neill was at least 20 percentile points over the party 
average, thus confirming his own self assessment when he 
declared, 11I 1m a terrifically Democratic partisan. 117 Of 
special interest are the scores of Hale Boggs, a Southern 
Democrat whose percentages show that he voted more often with 
his northern colleagues than one might expect of a southerner. 
Boggs Has lm.ovm to stray from party voting, but only one-half 
as often as ethel' Southern Democrats. 8 His image of being 
- - - --
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11
-too conservative for a northerner, too JJ.beral for a 
southerner", although. it may fit him in many respects, is not 
entirely borne out by his liberal scores. 
Peabody cautions against the use of party unity 
scores as absolute indicator's of the degree of moderateness 
of a leader or potential. leader or of their use tovJard 
developing a clear cut image of that leader.9 What is more 
important, Peabody says, is the general view that other 
members of Congress have toward a leadei' or the view that 
the leader has toward himself~ For example, extensive study 
could reveal an effort by a leader to show a more moderate 
voting record than he might naturally show in hopes that it 
would stand him in good stead as a potential leader. 
Table 1 reveals that the party leaders as a group 
had higher party unity scores than the average for the party. 
In the 90th Congress, for example, the average party member 
voted t1ith his party 63% of the time while the leaders as a 
group voted 80% of the time. In the 9lst Congress the 
average for the members was 59%, the leaders, 77%. The other 
scores reveal similar findings. (Party unity scores are for 
all votes, while "major bill" votes would probably show even 
higher party unity). 
It can be concluded from the Table that the scores 
show that party leaders tend to vote more frequently with the 
majority of their party than does the average party member. 
This would confirm eax•lier findings that party leaders are 
strong, loyal, national party members. 
r=:----
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'£he1•e are a limited number of in~depth studies 
regarding ideology as a criterion for the selection of 
majority party leaders. In recent years a few studies have 
emerged which have challenged the basic premise set forth by 
Truman, Hl.nckley, and Peabody that pa1•ty leaders tend to be 
modera·tes who represent the median, or middle in party 
ideology 1 a vie"L-1 which has probabJ y been the most widely 
accepted one regarding ideology. 
David Truman has said that it is unlikely that a 
member could secure enough votes from all segments of the 
party unless he was an ideological moderate.10 Barbara 
Hinckley indicated that a moderate roll-call voting record 
is probably necessary to attain a leadership position. 11 
. Peabody says 1 11 \'Ji th only a rare exception or two, a potential 
candidate cannot deviate far from'the mainstream of his 
party's ideological orientation if he hopes to become a 
12 leader, 11 
.In a study conducted by Duncan MacRae in which he 
analyzed. the roll·· call voting of the House of Representatives 
during the Blst Congress, House leaders were found to score 
close to the median when comparecJ. with ethel" Democrats on 
13 ~1hat he called the "Fair Deal" scale, Patterson, on the 
other hand, after studying two contradictory hypotheses 
regarding the ideological positions of' party leaders, says 
that he cru1 find no generally uniform relationship between 
leadership status and ideological posi'tlon, 14 
---- --------~ . ... ~ 
Further speculation on ideological positions led to 
a study by Sullivan in which he concluded that, unlike the 
variables of personality and skill, seniority or regional 
consideration, 
Norms of moderateness and party support are less 
than crucial variables ••• patterns of voting in the 
84th and 92nd congresses indicate that par•ty leaders 
are recruited neither on the basis of some party-
support criterion, nor accor~ing to a strict 
middleman prescriptive norm. 5 
Since there seems to be a lack of ag1•eement on the part of 
the previous studies, the need for further analysis is 
indicated. 
Sullivan argues that 11high party-support is not a 
very p1•evalent voting pattern for most, or indeed, even many 
leaders before their leadership recruitment. 1116 He concluded 
this from compal•ing Boggs, O'Neill, and McFall r.•ith non-
leaders from like regions whose party unity scores tended to 
be higher than the leaders' scores. Sullivan likewise 
compared the leaders' Conservative Coalition scores, 17 before 
and after selection, with their non-leader colleagues. In 
both comparisons he found the leaders moving toward 
moderateness after selection while 
indicated little change during the 
Sullivan then asks the question, 
the non-leaders' scores 
18 
same period of time. 
Does the change in scores reflect the impact of 
the leadership position on the voting or is it 
symptomatic of a more general trend toward moderate-
ness in congressional voting in recent years?19 
He answoz•s this question with, 11 The movement of leaders tov1ard 
more moderate positions in the party lacked any parallel 
e - ~-~-~-~-­
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moYement among non-leaders. In conclusion, he says, 
It appears that becoming a party leader does not 
carry with it the highly supportive voting behavior 
o.ften thought to be required of a leadership position. 
The results indicate that not only is the high-party 
support pattern not a significant criterion shaping 
leadership selection, but it is not a behavio2il out-
come associated with the leadership position. 
Sullivan then goes on to reject ideology or voting behavior 
as being a crucial criterion for leadership selection. 
3.5 
Sullivan must be challenged on the following points: 
(l) Party unity scores do show clearly that the party 
leaders, Albert, Boggs, O'Neill, and McFall, are strong party 
members since their• party unity scores are higher than those 
of the party average. (2) The intent of Truman, Hinckley, 
and Peabody's hypothesis seems to be that it is unlikely that 
an ttextremist 11 would be recruited as a party leader. Also 
the implicat:l.on is that the term "moderate" covers a t~ide 
range of ideology but excludes'extremism. Sullivan consis-
tently uses the term 11 strict 11 when referring to party scores 
or ideology, thus making his charge as to the inaccuracies of 
their hypothesis irrelevant since their basic definitions are 
different. (3) Sullivan's concern that the non-leaders' 
party unity scores were higher than the leaders' scores led 
him to conclude that the leaders' scores were not impressive 
enough. to be considered high-support scores. Party unity 
scores of leaders need not be the highest in the majority 
party to be impressive or to indicate strong party loyalty. 
If they Here, they might represent a partisanship that some 
would consider undesirable in potential leaders. In other 
-----------
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vJords, there is a difference bet1,;een high party loyalty and 
strong or consistent party loyalty, the latter being, in all 
probability, what; Truman et.al. had in mind. (4) It is 
unclear why SulHvan dismissed the possibility that the 
general congressional trend toward moderateness in recent 
years might; account for a similar phenomenon among the 
leaders. Instead, he chose to find greater significance in 
the fact that the non-leaders group did not show the same 
trend totvard moderateness.. The fact is, a similar trend 
toward moderateness did occur among anothel:' group of non-
leaders, namely that group of non-leaders who challenged the 
leaders and lost. Additionally, the average party-unity 
scores and conservative coalition scores of the entire party 
show a definite trend toward moderateness during the time 
per.iod of Sullivanls study. He does not make it clear wh:y 
he chooses to ignore this. There is a highly plausible 
argument that could be made for the changing trend which 
occurred tVithin the leadership. An example of' the above 
suggestion is John McFallls noteworthy decline in his 
opposition to the conservative coalition. There is no proof 
that this had w.1ything to do with his selection as majority 
whip. Rather, coincidentally, the issues of these particnlar 
congresses, one issue in particular, Vietnam, could well have 
accounted for his chm1ge. As a matter of personal conscience, 
he strayed from the majority of his party and continued to 
support administration policies of' the war rather than join 
the rest of the leadership in ·t;urning against the ad.'11inis-
trationls policies.22 Additlonally, the Nader repoi't on 
~---,-----
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McFall indicated a definite conservative trend in his 
district, one which he would have been politically unwise to 
ignore.23 (5) Sullivan's basic premise that ideology may 
have less to do with leadership selection than the other 
criteria may be correct, but his analysis in support of this 
reasoning lacks credibility. The hypothesis of the other 
researcher's I'omains unchallenged. 
In OI'der to analyze whe·cher or not party leaders 
tend to be moderates, some critel'ia must be established 
whereby the party leaders can be categorized. The standard 
used by Hinckley in her 1970 study of party leadership made 
the follovJ:i.ng designations. A "conservative" vote less than 
L~O% of the time in opposition to the conservative coalition, 
a 11 lioeral11 vote Bo% or more in opposition to the coalition, 
and a 11 model'o.te 11 vote between 40% and 79% in opposition to 
the conservative coalition.24 
Although these arbitrary designations may be 
questioned, they suffice nevertheless in establishing a 
rather loose interpl'etation of the ideological position of 
party leaders. Sullivan prefel'red using stricter criteria 
ru1d his conslusions wel'e based on those rathel' than 
Hinckley's. However', the vel'y nature of ideology, its 
chameleon chai'actei', would seem more fairly and t~isely placed 
within looser restrictions. 
Using Hinckley's percentages it can be seen from the 
conservative coalition Table 2 that only one party leader, 
John McFall, could be labeled a "liberal", at least fol' a 
L__ 
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time, but that wa.s cancelled by his abrupt conservative 
swlng betl-Jeen 1969 and 1974 when he definitely qualified as 
a "moderate". His over-all score clearly makes him a 
moderate, however, Thomas P. O'Neill, though 11ithin the 
designated range for moderate, could by a stricter definition 
be called a liberal here. 
As the table indicates, the total average for the 
pa1•·i;y leaders ( 69%) is exactly the same as that of the 
Northern Dernocrats(69), both being almost in the middle of 
the moderate range. A further study could conceivably 
analyze a table such as this and c orne up with the hypothesis 
tha·t it is not par•ty leaders 1 averages that are imp.ortant, 
but only individual leader's averages in establishing leader 
·selection criter•ia, However, there may be a special signi-
ficance to the leaders' averages being a criterion for 
selec·tion. It could be argued that there should be a 
variation in individual leader 1 s scores so that there is a 
balance and they are collectively moderate.) 
It is possible that Sullivan's hypothesis is true, 
that leaders become more moderate after attaining leadership 
positions than befol'e selection and that moderateness, 
therefore, is not a criterion for selection. However, even 
his own data, while showing both O'Neill and McFall passing 
the mark from liberal to moderate after selection, indicate 
their doing so by the narrowest of percentages, For example, 
O'Neill's conservative coalition opposition score before 
selection as whip was 81% and after selection, 77%. A 
~----
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diffex•ent interpretation could shm~ those scores to rest in 
either category both before and after. Five percent could 
l;lardly be regarded as a significant difference when related 
to an individual's ideology. 
Both the Party Unity Table and the Conservative 
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Coalition Table reveal strong party loyalty and moderateness 
on the part of the leaders of the majority party of the 
House of Representatives. If the hypothesis can be proven 
that a party leader is more moderate than he was as a 
recruit, it does not necessarily prove any relationship with 
the leadership selection process unless. that change to 
moderateness is a consistent phenomenon exclusive to party 
leaders. The basic hypothesis here, that party leaders must 
be moderat&s in order to be selected, is not disturbed. The 
fact remains that all indications are that party leaders 
were moderates before selection and continued to be so after 
selection. 
Safe-Seats 
Another criterion for the selection of party leaders 
that has often been listed is the necessity of holding a 
safe-seat. Peabody says that "holding a. safe-seat is a 
prerequisite for a party leadership posi tion. 1125 iiolfingel• 
and Hollinger say that the most influential positions in the 
House are held by members whose districts 
them without regard to national political 
continue to elect 
26 
trends. These 
observations make it necessary to not only define the nature 
of the safe-seat, but to examine its importance as a 
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criterion fo~ selection in the formal party leadership 
positions. 
Wolfinger and Hollinger define the Democratic safe-
seat as that; which meets the following cri ter•ia: ( 1) won by 
a Democrat in every special and general election since 19)-J.O, 
(2) won by an average of 60% or more of the two-party votes 
since 1944, (3) >Jon by not less than 55% of the vote in 
every election since 1946.27 
It; has been proven tha·t a member must be consis-
tently re-elected in order to acquire the necessary 
seniority to be eligible for a leadership position.. Now it 
is necessary to examine whether or not these party leaders 
have actually held safe-seats. Has it been necessary for 
leaders to have both seniority and a safe-seat? 
The difficulty of obtaining the exact percentages 
by which the four party leaders, Alber·t, O'Neill, Boggs, and 
McFall haye won in their respective districts every year'. 
since their initial elections makes it impossible to deter-
mine whether or not they have met the exact criteria of the 
safe-seat every time as established above. Information is 
available in enough elections, ho1vever, so that the actual 
point which is being examined here can be sufficiently 
studied and conclusions can be reached. 
Of ·the four leaders studied here, only Carl Albert 
and Thomas o•Neill have won their seats in the House by 
margins that easily fall within ·t;hose set forth by Wolfinger 
and Hollinger•. For example, Carl Albert has won every 
general election since 19L~8 by at least 70 percent of the 
" 
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vote with the exception of 1968 when he 1von by only 68 
percent.28 In all but a few instances he had only token 
opposition, having even won handily in the primary elections. 
Since 1966, with the exception of 1968, he has won re-election 
29 by 75 percent of the vote. 
Thomas P. O'Neill, likewise, has had little trouble 
in his re-election efforts.3° His most difficult election 
was in 1952, his first campaign for a House seat. Even then, 
however, he won by receiving 60 percent of the vote. Since 
1956 he has received at least 73 percent of the vote in the 
general elections and five times he has. had no Republican 
opposition. Since 1966 being unopposed, he has received 
100 percent of the vote in every general election. 
Hale Boggs does not have the record of either Albert 
or O'Neill in easy re-election.31 Although on n~~erous 
occasions he has won re-election handily, this was not alt~ays 
the case. In his first bid for re-election he lost, thus 
inter~upting his House ca~eer for four years. It is signi-
ficant that immediately prior to his campaign for majority 
leader, he won re-election ~n his home district by a bare 
51 percent.(l968) His re-election in 1964, 1966, 1970 were 
won by an average of 64 percent of the vote. Even if Boggs 
had won some of his elections by the high percentage of the 
vote as had Albort and O'Neill, it is still significant that 
he had trouble at times. He not only was the only one of 
the four leaders who had lost an election, he was the only 
one who nearly lost another and at a time when he was 
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actually a party leader. (He was majority whip at the time. 
( 1968) 
John McFall, along with the other three mentioned 
leaders, has represented a traditionally Democratic district. 
McFall 1 s district, however, has become increasingly conser-
vative in the 1960s and 70s, which may account for the 
occasions when he did not win an overwhelming percentage of 
32 the vote. In the House general election of 1966, HcFall 
won 57 percent of the vote, 54 percent in 1968, and 63 
percent in the 1970 election. It can be seen that even 
though ~1cFall 1 s percentages have been high in the 1970s (he 
won by 69 percent in 1976 and in 197!~ was endorsed by both 
parties) he has had years when his scores did not meet rule 
munber hm nor rule number three in the list of three rules 
which define a safe-seat. vfuile he continued to build 
seniority by his consistent re-elections he, like Boggs, did 
not do so with the majorities of either Albert or 0 1Neill. 
It can be said that the four men under study 
represented districts that had been traditionally Democratic 
strongholds, 33 but it canno~ be said that all four won their 
elections with ease. It becomes dubious therefore, whether 
it is true that representing a safe-seat is necessary for 
selection for a majority party leadership position. What 
can be said ~Jith accuracy is that the four leaders under 
study have been returned to the House without interruption 
ten years prior to their selection for a leadership position, 
but that occasional close contests in their home dlstricts 
----- -
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did not deter their eventual selection. As party leaders 
both Boggs and McFall were selected aftev relative.ly low 
percentage victories in the general election. 
It may be significant that the avel'age scores for 
the three general elections, those of 1966 1 1968, 1970, show . 
that in the cases of all four leaders, Albert, O'Neill, 
Boggs, and HcFall,. the average percentages 1-1ere over the 55 
percent established as the minimum which constitutes the 
safe-district or safe-seat. Albert and O'Neill were well 
above that 55 percent minimum while Boggs' avevage score was 
63 percent and McFall's 58 percent. While this may be the 
score that vesear•chers would consider important in making 
their point, this vie>1 must be faulted since even if the 
membev had lost one election and was then re-elected in the 
following election, his average score could still have been 
above 55 percent. Yet, one defeat would hardly establish 
itself under the heading of a safe-seat. For example, in 
the case of HcFall, had he received 49 percent of the vote in 
1968, thereby losing the election, then was re-elected in 
1970 by the 63 percent that·he actually won by, his average 
for that three year periad would be 56 percent. Yet what is 
important in determining a safe-seat is the ability to win 
every election by at least 55 percent. Average percentages 
would appear to be less significant. It caunot be said, in 
the 1960s at least, that John McFall held a safe-seat. 
Certainly Hale Boggs did not represent a safte-seat in '.968. 
In the cases of Albert and O'Neill, on the other hand, 
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indications are that their elections would have been secure 
r•.egardless of any national political controversies which 
might have adversely affected their colleagues or party. 
Con·l;rary to pl"ior research then, it must be said here 
that the safe-seat, although desirable, is not necessary for 
selection to a party leadership position. Hore specifically 
appropriate to this study, it has been established that all 
four of the pax•ty leaders in this study did not represen·t 
safe-seats. The only common thread here is that all four 
leaders were consistently returned to Congress ten years 
prior to their selection as leaders in their party and there-
fore, acquired sufficient seniority to be eligible for 
leader' ship positions. 
Little has been written about the importallce of 
corr.mittee membership as a criterion for leadership selection. 
Nevertheless, because of the importax1ce of committees, it is 
likely that a member's reputation would be a reflection, in 
part, of his work or contributions to committee work. His 
reputatlon here vwuld surely affect his chances or eligibility 
for leadership. 
It is a well known fact that the work of the House 
is done in corn..'lli ttees. ~/hen a freshman congressman arrives 
for his first term in the House he will, in all likelihood, 
make ru1 effol't to be assigned to a corr.mi ttee appr'opriate to 
his Ol~n expertise or one which l•lill enable him to serve the 
needs of his district. Certain members may jealously seek a 
i=: t='- --- -
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position on one of the so-called exclusive committees (Rules, 
'ila.ys and Hea.ns, or Appropriations) or one of the semi-
exclusive committees (Agriculture, Public ~Jerks, Armed 
Services, Banking and Gurrency, Education and Labor, Foreign 
Affairs, Interstate commerce, Judiciary, Post Office, Science 
and Space Administration). 
Even though tradHion dictates that a freshman will 
not be appointed to one_ of the exclusive committees, many 
members quickly go to work trying to lay the ground work for 
eventual appointment to one of these committees. Those who 
soon become familiar with the traditions of the House learn 
that assignment to an exclusive, or next best, a semi-
exclusive committee, is advantageous to their careers and 
may enhance their chances to elevate themselves to a 
leadership position. 
All but one of the majority party leaders of the 
tj~e period of this study served as a member of one of the 
exclusive coJrJni ttees and, moreover, were appointed to these 
committees very early in their House careers. The fourth 
leader served on a semi-exclusive committee. There is 
insufficient evidence to establish the exact reason behind 
the luck of their assignments. No doubt many of them 
happened to know the right person who was influen·t;ial in 
helping them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of 
the majority party leaders have had experience on the 
prestigious committees. 
Thomas P. 0 1Neill was chosen to serve on the Rules 
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Gommi ttee after only one term in the House, being ·t;he second 
member in the history of the House to be appointed af·ter such 
a short tenure. J4 Hale Boggs was selected for the \'lays and 
11eans Committee after a similar period of service in the 
House ).5 This was unusual conside:r>ing that, on the ave:r>age, 
membe:r>s have served at least three terms and mo:r>e gene:r>ally 
five te:r>ms before being appointed to this committee.J6 John 
11cFall received an appointment to the Appropriations 
Committee in the thi:r>d term of his service in the House. Carl 
Albert, the only leade:r> who was not a member of an exclusive 
committee, served on the AgricultU:t>e Corrilllittee from his early 
years in the House until he became majority leader.37 
Service on the three exclusive committees gives an 
individual C011llll.ittee member a relatively higher deg:r>ee of 
exposu:r>e to senior party leaders, a factor which later will 
be established as being critical to the ca:t'eer plans of an 
aspiring leader. The business of the Rules Committee, for 
example, is such 'that continuous coordination vJith pa:t'ty 
leaders is essential if the party-sponsored bills are to 
become legislation. Fu:r>ther, the Ways and !1eru1s Committee, 
influential because of its role as the Committee on Commit-
tees charged with all committee assignments (along with the 
party leaders) provides the member with a potentially 
powerful role as well as significant opportunity to acquire 
a high profile. 
The point which must be emphasized here is that 
llotential leaders are apt to find service on the important 
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committees as beneficial if they hope to become leaders, and 
it would seem necessary that they serve on those committees 
permitting the greatest runount of exposure of their talents. 
More ·i;o the point of this paper, however, is that all four 
leaders mentioned above were chosen very early in their 
careers to serve on the prestigious committees of the House. 
11Extra-~_ll£_ricular" Activit~ 
In addition to serving on an exclusive or semi-
exclusive committee, these party leaders were inclined to 
distinguish themselves in other ways. Significant here has 
been participation in extra-curricular activities that in 
some way single them out early as having not only energy, but 
ambition as well as ts.lent. This participation may not only 
have represented the above qualities, but may have indicated 
a loyalty to their role as a Representative, or further, it 
may have represented leadership aspirations. 
There were nUlllerous ways that these leaders distin-
guished themselves in activities other than the basic work 
load of ·i;he House. They may have:· (1) been expert or active 
floor debaters pursuing causes with more than average energy 
and acumen, thus attracting the attention of their party and 
its leaders; (2) accepted party.assignments that may have 
originally been assigned on a regional basis, and they may 
have performed them particularly well; (3) accepted appoint-
ments to joint or conference committees; (4) built intense 
personal friendships and loyalties; (5) become expert in a 
particalar area of legislation; or (6) impressed senior party 
~ 
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leaders Hith their ability. 
Brief sketches will show that all four of the leaders 
studied here qualify in nearly all categories. Those 
categories in Hhich they all absolutely qualified will be 
singled out for placement among the co@non denominators 
peculiar to those who attain leadership positions, thus 
further r•educing the number of members of the majority party 
who become oligi ble for pa1•ty leadership positions. 
Carl Alber_! 
Albert, aged 38 vJhen elected to the House, was known 
for his particularly hard work on the Agriculture Committee 
in the days Hhen Sam Rayburn was Speaker.38 Additionally, 
because of his oratorical skills dating back to college days, 
he became an extremely ef.fective floor debater Hhich brought 
him to the attention of Rayburn. Because of the proximity 
of Albert's district to Rayburn's, the two had interests in 
common even though representing two di.fferent states. As a 
r•esult o.f a .friendship which developed between the two and 
the obvious conridence that Rayburn had in Albert, Rayburn 
chose Albert to be majority whip in 19,5). This close 
association which led to this appointment was referred to by 
Fischer as a father-son relationship.39 
Peabody says that Rayburn w.as also impr•essed •~ith 
Albert's single-minded dedication to the House; that is, 
Albert never indicated~ intention o.f abandoning a House 
for other publi.c office. 40 (Even though it may be 
difficul1; to prove that this appealed to Rayburn, it is 
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nevertheless true that Hs.yburn was known to have valued this, 
kind of dedication and there is speculation that this caused 
him to by-pass Hale Boggs, an obvious contender for the t-Jhip 
position. Hayburn may have been annoyed at Boggs' entry as 
a gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana in 1962). 
Albert becarae known for M.s ability to know members, 
call them by their first names and generally keep a high 
profile. His exposure and obvious interest in the House and 
its individual members resulted in his being chosen in 1970 
as the most popular Democratic Congressman in the House.41 
Albert was apparently not only dedicated to the House 
but to the work of the House as t-lell, working as he did six 
out of sev,en days per week. This is not necessarily charac-
teristic of all Rouse members, especially of those who 
commute from other eastern cities to their jobs at the 
Capitol. Many of these long hours were spent a.ttending 
sessions of the House, which he attended faithfully, 
observing procedures and the conduct of his colleagues. Said 
Albert of his own climb up the leadership ladder: 
I guess you could say that the main element in my 
climb to the leadership is the fact that I 1ve heard 
more speeches than anyone else and called more people 
by their first names. I 1ve always been fascinated 
by them. Thel'e are so many variances and eccentricities. 
I got so I could guess w;Lj;(hin a fet-J votes how they would 
vote on any given issue.~ 
Hale Bog~ 
Boggs, aged 26 when first elected to the House, made 
an early impressive record in the House in much the same way 
as Alber·~, that is, as a forceful floor debater. Latel' he 
gained a reputation for his ability to preside over the House 
in the absence of the Speaker. Peabody says: 
He remained one of the feH Hho 
the House and obtain almost insta..c"l.t 
quiet rap of the gavel ••• if any one 
been saip to charac·~erize Boggs, it 
fulness,43 
could preside over 
attention with a 
trait could have 
.,as force-
Neil MacNeil said, along the same vein, that only certain men 
in the House in the 1960s could command the attention of their 
colleagues in the House chambers. Among a fetl other, he says, 
Hale Boggs could pull his colleagues from their cloakrooms to 
.hear what he had to say.4L~ 
Boggs gained a reputation over the years as being an 
expert in the area of trade and economic policy. This 
expertise made him an important member of the Joint Economic 
Comcni ttee and Chairman of the .Joint Sub-Com:mi ttee in Foreign 
Economic Policy. Additionally, he was appointed to the 
Warren Commission which investigated the Jolm Kennedy 
assassination (1964), the Eisenhower Commission on the Causea 
and Prevention of Violence (1958), and was chairman of the 
Platform Committee for the 1968 Democratic National 
Convention. 45 
Boggs, like Albert, gained the favor of Speaker 
Rayburn and likewise became a protege of Rayburn's.46 When 
Rayburn appointed Albert i~hip in 1955, he created the 
position of deputy whip and gave it to Boggs who probably saw· 
this as a special favor although at the same time may have 
felt he was more in line for the whip position than Albert. 
Still, he must have known that Rayburn •1as impressed Hith him 
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if only fl'Om the knowledge that a position had been created 
for him. 
Thomas P. 0 1Neill 
O'Neill, elected to the House at age 38, and appointed 
to the Rules Comnuttee after only one congressional term, was 
clearly a favorite of John McCormack. 47 HcCormack always 
included O'Neill in his strategy planning meetings and often 
invited him to join in his private meetings with senior party 
members. O'Neill remained loyal to party leaders on domestic 
issues but was the leader, in later years, of a revolt 
against the policies on Vietnam of both Albert and Boggs. He 
actllally voted against them on every war related issue only 
to have many par•ty leaders follow him eventually. 48 Even 
though this may represent a certain lack of loyalty to the 
Speaker, it is a tribute to his forceful ability to convince 
the other leaders of his views. 
In_1970 he became the Democratic Party Campaign 
Chairman and won the respect of party members by distributing 
funds fairly regardless of the candidates' political philoso-
phies. He w.as also instrumental in many of the reforms in the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 • 49 
O'Neill is not a quiet mro1, but rather a dynamic, 
forceful, and highly partisan individual who makes his 
opinions known with enough effectiveness to be highly persua-
sive. He, like the other leaders, has kept a high profile 
and accumulated many friends and intense loyalties.50 
-
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John ,J. l'1cFal:); 
Jobn HcFall, elected to Congress at age 38 1 gained a 
position on the Appropriations Committee early in his caree~. 
Seniority put him in a position of eventually becoming chair· 
man of the Corrmittee on Transportation, a sub-co1nmittee of the 
larger Appropriations Committee. Indications are that for 
one who eventually gained a formal leadership position, HcFall 
kept a relatively low profile, not often speaking out in 
committee or having an exemplary record in the authorship of 
lawa.51 
HcFall became active in the whip hierarchy early in 
52 his career. It was here where his extra-curricular 
activities grew. In 1962 he became assistant whip for 
California, one of 18 such positions throughout the country. 
John Moss, a fellow California Congressman, had become a 
deputy whip by 1962 and in his absence, or for one reason or 
another, NcFall often substituted Ol' stepped in when Moss was 
needed elsewhere.' McFall even occasionally filled in for Carl ~[~-~~~ 
Albert as acting majority leader. At the same time, McFall 
continued to be loyal to and worked closely with Boggs, whom 
he supported in the latter1 s race for majority leader. When 
Boggs became majority leader, O'Neill was appointed whip and 
McFall moved up to become a deputy whip along with John 
Brademus of Indiana. In 1973 McFall rose to become majority 
whip with many years of experience in the whip business. 
McFall, in his capacity as deputy whip, had numerous 
occasions to work closely with Major•ity Leader O'Neill in 
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assisting him on the Honse floor mustering votes, Extensive 
floor exposure had surely made members of the House more 
aware of him than before, Additional personal contact made 
it easier to gather support for his own campaign for the whip 
position even though it was and still is an appointive 
position. 
I1cFall acknowledges that he l'las a protege of Carl 
Albert, If he was given early recognition, the respect of a 
senior leader, especially one who seemed in line foi' the 
speakership, probably was significant.53 That respect may 
have been great enough to have been partially responsible for 
I1cFall's rise in leadership ranks, 
F...xtensive biographies of members of the House of 
Representatives are aL~ost non-existent, For that reason it 
is difficult to obtain a complete list of all of the acti-
vities that these particular men have participated in, No 
doubt all of them have long lists of individual assignments 
that are no·!; readily available to the researcher. However, 
it is not difficult to obtain an impression as to the level 
of activity or participation of each member studied, 
'l'he following is a list of the common denominators 
in the area of extra-curricular activities that the party 
leaders shared that mey account, at least in part, for their 
rise in the leadership hierarchy, They cru1 be considered, 
therefore, as necessar-y qualifications for leadership 
selection, 
1. All of the above leaders entered the House of 
~---
---
54 
Representatives before the age of L~o. 
2. All of the individuals served an apprenticeship, 
became proteges, or were singled out for 
attention by a party leader who was or had 
served as Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
3. All served in some capacity or• performed some 
task that could be considered to be above the 
normal legislative load. 
4. All had served as majority whip. 
5. All who eventually reached the rank of majority 
leader were considered to be forceful and 
dynamic floor debaters. 
Le.£ldersill Poten~ 
It has been shown thus far that the possession of 
seniority, protege status, party loyalty, certain committee 
assignments, moderateness and extra activities have been 
c01mnon characteristics of those selected for leadership 
positions from 1962-1976. With the exception of protege 
status and certain extra assignments, these qualities may not 
have been unique nor peculiar to majority party leaders only. 
Certainly ol;her members of the majority party had adequate 
seniority, desirable co~nittee assignments, and other quali-
fications that might have made them eligible to become party 
leaders. It is possible, also, that other members might have 
had the proper credentials that would have made them eligible 
for leadership in another style. (This latter point will be 
clabo1•ated later.) What is important here is that there 
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.5.5 
obvious J.y remain ethel' qualities or chars.cteris tics that 
selected party leadel'S had that further separated them from 
their colleagues, thus confirming their eligibility. That 
quality can be called leadership potential. 
Aside from being the most difficult characteristic 
to assess or even define, leadership potential, for purposes 
of this study, must be de-studied vis-a-viz its affect on the 
collegial style or vice versa, That is, it is not sufficient 
to define leadership potential as an element unto itself, but 
rather as it relates to the style which provided its backdrop, 
It must be said at the outset that studies are 
probably more limited in this area regarding individual 
leaders than in any other element of congressional 1eader-
ship,.54 However, three individuals who have written exten-
sively on House leadership, Peabody, Polsby, and Ripley, have 
done so while they were in Washington D.c. for the express 
purpose of studying party leadership, While there are a few 
others t-Jho have made similar studies, it is these three who 
have probably written more extensively in the particular 
areas which are now in question • .5.5 
While all of the 43.5 members of the House of 
Representatives likely possess a certain degree of leadership 
abil:l.ty or they would not be members of Congress, leadership 
among one's constlt~ents and leadership among one 1 s peers 
reqttil•e different qualifications. It is quite unlikely that 
all possess the unique leadership traits that make them 
eligible for party leadership positions, 
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If one were to poll all House members, it is 
reasonable to assume that many might express little o.r no 
desire to achieve a leadership position. The lack of 
personal runbHion might reduce the list of potential leaders 
considerably. Because their personal goal may be to rise 
only to that level in the majority party 11here they can 
effectively serve their constituents and be consistently 
re-elected, they may have little or no leadership ambition. 
Further, the location of their district may disqualify them 
and inhibit any desire that might otherwise be there.56 
Therefore, for reasons that are impossible to discover here, 
party members may simply lack the will, energy, or desire to 
rise in the party leadership hierarchy. 
Gertaln members who are eligible for leadership 
posHions may flnd it more to their liking to rise to their 
conmrl. ttee 1 s chairmanship. For example, even though Wilbur 
!"!ills was thought by his colleagues to possess leadership 
qualities, he dld not choose to run for fol'mal party leader-
ship, being quite content with his role as Chairm~~ of Ways 
and Mea:ns.57 I1any Southern Democrats, ineligible for 
leadership positions because of lack of moderateness, hardly 
suffer since they often acquire chairmanships through their 
seniority. 
It is almost impossible to establish the time when 
desire to achieve high positions began on the part of party 
leaders, unless one were to personally interview those men. 
Surely there are instances where members of the majority 
i!=' 
t___:=-== 
W~ -- ---~~-~-
-----
g·--- --
pa:r•ty embarked on. a path which they hoped Hould lead to 
leadership the minute they were elected to Congress. Still 
others may not have x•ealized the possibllity untll they were 
appointed to a lesser party position (such as zone whip). It 
seems reasonable to speculate that as re-election became 
easier each time, accumulated seniority and a respectable 
posltion on a prestigious committee becrune realities, the 
idea to achieve a formal majority party position may have 
come within the realm of possibllity. 
Equally as difficult to determine, without the 
benefit of personal interview, is the reason why they wished 
to become party leaders. In some cases, their ascent may 
have been quite accidental. Their colleagues, recognizing 
leadership ability, may have encouraged them through personal 
appeal. In some cases, an inner drive for personal power may 
have been present. Still others may have sought high position 
because they ~~ere dissatisfied with the leadership candidates 
at the time • 
. While those aspiring for leadership positions were 
obviously ambitious, others, for one reason or another, 
lacked the qualities, the behavior and deterw~nation charac-
teristic of the aspiring leaders. Obviously, here we will 
not readily find common denominators, but the question must 
still be asked: in what way did their personalities, their 
skills, and ambition combine to make pai•ty leaders successful 
in their quest for leadership positions? Further, if some of 
these qualit:!.es were not as strong as others, which proved 
the most important for that candidate? Through the use of 
biographical analysis, a general impression of t;he leaders 
will help to answer the question. 
Carl Albert 
58 
It was shown earlier that Albert. spent a great deal 
of time on the floor of the House observing his colleagues in 
action. He crone to know their personalities well and to 
predict where they would stand on certain issues, He made it 
a point to get to know each party member and had a reputation 
o~ helping members when he could by granting political 
favors and helping them with their 11 pet 11 bills. He was also 
noted for the interest he took in the welfare of his 
colleaguea,58 These personal traits and activities on the 
part of Albert could undoubtedly be interpreted by some as 
Albert' a way of recognizing early in his career the need fox• 
a deep knowledge of the House if one were to become a party 
leader. Without the benefit ·of an extensive personal 
biography of Albert, however, that presumption cannot be 
made. Vie can only assume that he either had a natural 
curiosity abollt people and their behavior or he felt this kind 
of knowledge was beneficial to the every day workings of the 
House of Representatives. 
Albert's personal popularity is in evidence in any 
and all literature about him.59 His own personal practice of 
loyalty to-v1ard his colleagues J.s su.;r.-'6-J.y part of the reason 
behind that popularity. For example, tvhen it was suggested 
that he run against John McCormack for the speakerahip upon 
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the death of Sam Rayburn, his reply Has, "I 1vould never do 
that against John HcCorrnack, Hr, Rayburn and Hr. HcCorrnack 
picked roe and made roe Hhip ,· and to run against Hr. 11cCorrnack 
60 
would have to be the act of an ingrate." 
Albert 1s affability as a human being led to a comment 
which apparently summed up a general feeling about him; 
11Nobody's made at Carl. 1161 This stemmed, perhaps, from 
Albert's reluctance to be disagreeable when his opinion 
conflicted with others. No doubt this was interpreted 
occasionally as a weakness, but it apparently enhanced rather 
than hurt his popularity.62 In part, then, Albert's popu-
larity may have been the result of an inoffensive nature 
which raay have been a relief to a House often riddled with 
petty jealousies and ambitions. 
Peabody refers to the importance of a subtle display 
of competence or intelligence as being an admirable quality 
and one which is valued by House rnernbers, 63 Those members 
who openly display or flaunt their superior abilities are 
often rejected by their colleagues when leadership races 
occur. Evidence is that whatever abilities or talen·ts Albert 
had 1 he made no effort to display them in an offensive manner. 
In Albert's campaign for majority leader in 1962, 
hl.s strategy seemed to have suited his style, That is, the 
acce1eration of the habit that had so long been his, namely 
personal member-to-member contact, was in keeping with his 
life-long congressional practice of becoming personally 
involved with his colleagues. Albe1··b 1 s main strategy 
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consisted of telegraphing all House members as soon as he had 
decided to run fo1' majority leade1' upon Rayburn's death. Not 
only did he telegraph, but he telephoned each of the members 
individually asking for their support, Polsby refers to this 
strategy as an "inside" appeal as opposed to the 11 outside 11 
effort of appealing to organizations external to the House 
for support. 64 
Albert 1 s strategy may have been based on the 
presumption that his own popularity was his greatest asset, 
or it may have been the result of a keen awareness of the 
merit of appealing to those who actually make the selection. 
For whatever the reasons, Albert concentrated his energy 
toward persuading his colleagues, rather than outside groups, 
to support; him in the race for majo1•ity leader, 
Albert's support during his campaign for majority 
leader consisted of many loyal friends in the Oklahoma 
delegation as well as those v1hom he had personally helped 
thr•oughout his years in the House. 6-" Pols by cites many of 
the reasons for that kind of support taken from personal 
interviews of majority pa.t>ty membel'S, These comments offer 
insights into r•easons why certain members voted the way they 
do in leadership selection contests. The following are 
comments rrom those interviews: 
He's done so many things for people. They trust 
him, They think of him, "Here's a man I can talk to 
when I need help, 11 h'hen the members go about picking 
a leadgg. they want personal services, not intellec-
tuals. 
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• • • • Albert developed quite a genius for 
knowing what people would do , • • , Another service 
he performed endears him to people. Carl's the klnd 
of a guy everybody could find. He would talg
7
to the 
leadership for the rank-in-file Congressman. 
Albert's approach to legislative matters is, 
well, everybody oughtto vote his own district. , 
He brings his f1•iends and his enemies in to vote 
both • • • • ~Vhy the hell get a certain (southern 
Congressman) out to vote? He doesn't vote with us 
on anything. And he's a deputy whipl It's 
ridiculous , •• the function of th<;>8whip (under Albert) is room service to members,b 
• • 
Albert got on the phone and tracked me down in 
the frozen wastes of northern Rocky state the first 
day after the Speaker was buried. You wouldn't 
think politicians would fall for tha-t; but many of 
them did. They were impressed by the fact that he'd 
called them first. As a result, he was able to line 
up a lot of members, including many n9:rthern bleeding 
heart liberals in the first few days,0~ 
Carl has been ver•y kind to me in the committee 
work &~d has done several things fQ5 me which have 
been very important for my people,f 
He is not only my neighbor but a member of my 
own committee and with it all a fine, able con-
scientious man who has been doing the dirty work 
for the leadership for a long time.71 
61 
Polsby quotes several members who felt that Albert 
deserved the position because of his service for six years 
as the party whip which not only gave him the support of the 
whip hierarchy, but gave him an active, highly visible 
role,72 vfuile some accounts of whip activity under Albert 
indicate that Albert did not use the whip position as 
extensively as did later whips for its intended purpose, his 
role as whip is a constant reference by many members who 
thought he had "earned the position of majority leader. ?3 
(It may be that Albert's role as whip was not as thoroughly 
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stuctied, thus accounting for the scant references to his 
performance in political studies. Evidently, however, certain 
members felt that his service as vJhip war•ranted promotion 
which indicates that, if nothing else, he 1-Jas highly visible 
in that role) • The following comments by his colleagues 
emphasizes his role as whip: 
Because I feel that he was entitled to it by 
reason of his effective part in the leadership of 
the House along with the S);lflaker and Nr. l1cCor·mack, 
I promised him my support • -(LJ. 
I made a commltment to Carl based on his years 
of ser•vice .as whip and the fact that he wa.s in line 
for this 7~ob from the standpoint of his long service as whip~ 
As one of ~~s deputy whips, I feel committed 
to Carl Albert. 
Albert's personal popularity, his service as whip, 
and his party loyalty all contributed to his selection as 
majority leader. Additionally, he had only one opponent, 
Richard Bolling of Hissouri, who later withdrew from the race 
thus making Albert's selection unanimous. Of great signi-
ficance also, is the fact that he evidently had the support 
of JobA NcCormack although the latter did not publicly 
endorse Albert. According to Polsby: 
!11•. Alber•t had an important further asset--
the apparent backing of John NcCormack. 11 I have 
heard 11cCor!l1ack say again and again tha·b we have to 
have a team player," one congressman said. 11 I guess 
he means by that a member of his team, and I suppose 
he favors Carl Albert • 11 I asked a ne1-1spaperman Hho 
was follot-~ing the situation closely to tell me who 
the most important congressman on Mr. Albert's side 
t,;as, and he replied, 11 John NcCormack" .Ff 
In s u:rmnary, Albert, who had all of the basic 
qualif'ica·bions in order, won largely because of his own 
pel'sonali ty and personal popularity coupled with his skill at 
capitalizing on the qualities that made him popule.r in the 
first place. 
Hale B~ 
Hale Boggs represents the kind of candidate who, 
while lacking the great personal popularity of Albert, never-
theless managed to be appointed whip and later elected 
majority leader by the Democratic caucus. He is an example 
of a party leader who was elected in spite of numerous 
obstacles, most of which occurred immediately preceding his 
selection as majority leader. 
As was noted earlier, Boggs had been chosen deputy 
whip by Rayburn Hho created t;hat position for him, When 
Albert became majority leader, Boggs was chosen to be 
majority whip. The background events leading to this latter 
selection m'e not available although it can be assumed that 
his role as deputy whip placed him in goodstanding~ 
The degree of leadership potential which can be 
ascribed to Boggs is more difficult to assess than Albert's 
because of Boggs' own behavior throughout his years in the 
House. That behavior can safely be described as erratic, 
more notably so during his last few years as a Representative78 
His earlier years, however, certainly proved to be signifi-
cant to his eventual selection as a party leader since by the 
time he was chosen for a leadership position, his personal 
behavior had become quite suspect in the eyes of many of his 
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colleagues. 
Boggs' forcefulness and oratorical ability had made 
him a very persuasive and prominent member of the House. As 
mentioned earlier, Boggs 1-1as able to find a ready audience 
when he chose to speak on the floor, and indi.cations are that 
it was not only his oratorical skill that made him impr<;Jssive, 
but also the content of the oratory. Additionally, according 
to Peabody, 
.Almost every member conceded that Boggs made a 
vigorous floor presentation and projected well on 
national television shotJs such as 11 Meet the Press" 
• • • • Aggressive, intelligent, and charming as n 
nearly any House member t-Jhen he wanted to be •••• 19 
Peabody also comments that Boggs• "stock-in-trade 
were intensive personal relationships with members of the 
House built up over the 26 years he had served in the House. 1180 
Apart frmn having loyal friends, h01~ever, some considered him 
arrogant snd unapproachable, at least during certain time 
periods, and the latter feeling was widespread enough so that 
it is necessary to further examine Boggs' role in the House 
to find the reason why he was able to capture a position that 
might have eventually led to the Speakership. 
It is necessary to insert here that Boggs' ques-
tionable behavior during his last few years in the. House, 
referred to earlier, was the result of his own personal 
81 problem with al.coholism. Apparently, his active congres-
sional life and his involvement in extra activities caused 
stress sufficient enough to create a need for alcohol to 
alleviate the pressure. The following are comments of a few 
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of his colleagues which present a picture of Boggs during 
this difficult time. 
We had this mark-up session in committee--Hale 
crune in, his face flushed; he was coherent, but 
arrogant as hell--he wanted to monopolize the session. 
The Chairman just kept quiet and let gim run along. 
It finally seemed to 'Hork itself out. 2 
Boggs crune on to the floor--his face 1ms flushed. 
It was as if he had taken a couple of amphetrunines, 
or a couple of 11 belts 11 , His arms were pumping up and 
dOlm. sl.le was speaking loudly, but not making much 
sense • .:> 
Hale Boggs--I still can't believe that he's a 
serious contender. But he's come bacl{ some from 
June, At that time an awful lot of people were 
very leery of Boggs ••• I 1m against Boggs becoming 
majority leader because he doesn't have sgtficient 
emotional stability to undertake the job, 4 
My normal inclination would have been to support 
Boggs, but his performance the last year or ·ewe--
drinking or some sort of carrying on--convinced me 
he shoul~~'t be majority leader, I did a little 
checking ar•ound and I decided he couldn 1t win, He 
had no solid support, not even in the South, I 
looked over the ot~gr candidates and decided to 
become one myself. 
Boggs had to come out strong, but very early I 
became convinced he did not have the votes, not even 
in the South, , , , My honest impression is that 
Hale Boggs is the least popular of the candidates 
• , , he has stepped on the toes of too many members, 
he's ru•rogant, and last year he must have flippea6 his lid, Now he's desperately trying to recoup.~ 
If it wasn't for personal weakness of Boggs, llis 
succession to majority leader would be a foregone 
conclusion, And that pattern is still his greatest 
asset, I had a liber•al tell me today that it was a 
serious question in his mind as to whether or not we 
should upset the8~attern of moving up from whip to majority leader, 
65 
Strangely enough, there are no comments of congres-
sional members about Boggs in Peabody's discussion which are 
complimentary toward Boggs, thus increasing the mystery as to 
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the reason for his ultimate victory. (Part of the l:'eason for 
the lack of comments of this nature in Peabody may be because 
the rese.arch which he was conducting may have been largely 
concerned with the phenomenon of the possible victory of an 
individual who was so obviously controversial, but \1hose 
credentials of an earlier career were such as to make him an 
obvious contender.) Yet, even in his earlier career, Boggs 
gave the appearance of one who was charming and charismatic 
at once, yet arrogant and condescending. The follo\•ing 
comment may shed light on the nature of his arrogance. 
His was not the intellectual and moral arrogance 
of a Morris or Steward Udall; it was a different 
kind. Boggs felt that once you were elected to the 
House you were a politician in your own right~ and 
past the stage where you needed to be coddled. He 
~;tst · ~8t impatient with other members f'rom time to 
vl.m.e • 
For want of information which might shed light on 
the leadership potential of Boggs, it appears that it is 
necessary to emphasize the appeal of his forceful, dynamic 
and persuasive deportment on the floor of the House as Hell 
as the periodic charm of his personality. There are 
indications that Boggs also developed strong friendships 1-lith 
older members of the House which may have enabled him to gain 
the folloHing of an extremely loyal, perhaps partisan, and 
certainly more senior following.89 
One could infer from the statements regarding Boggs' 
personality and his condition later in his life, that he was 
inordinately a...'ll.bi tious for a leadership position • This 
cannot be proven as a fact, of course, but the intensity of 
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his activities and his own desire to stand for election in 
the majority party tvhen he must have known himself that the 
stress of his life was taking its toll, show that he was not 
satisfied merely to represent his Louisiana district. This 
drive a..'ld ambition ·t-~ere probably his greatest asset in the 
light of his many handicaps. 
Under the circwnstances, hot-~ did Boggs actually 
win?. First, like Albert, he campaigned on an individual 
member-to-member basis rather than appealing to outside 
sources for help. Also, he gradually acquired the momentum 
in his campaign to the degree that the Speaker, while not 
only openly endorsing Boggs, acknot-Jledged that he was looking 
90 like a t-linner. Additionally, his closest opponent, Hor1•is 
Udal, Hhile offering formidable competition, was very junior 
91 
and had few prior leadership credentials. The other 
candidates managed to split the rest of the party's vote to 
the extent that Boggs finally finished with the greatest 
support. 
_Again, as with Albert, some members felt that he 
11 deserved11 the position by virtue of his service as whip. 
For others, it may have been a vote for the establishment. 
Boggs was the one candidate who had been blessed from time to 
time by senior party leaders and this, along with his personal 
relationships with senior party members, gave him essential 
92 
endorsements. 
There ls further evidence that Boggs won because he 
managed to "pull himself together" during his campaign and 
restore the earlier faith that his colleagues had in him.93 
This may have been halped by the fact tha·t he won his 1970 
election in Louisiana with ease rather than by the small 
margin of 1968. With this pressure gone, the earlier 
instabilities may have been forgotten. 
Obviously, Boggs' leadershtp potential, which had 
early manifested itself through his forceful, persuasive 
personality, made a lasting impression on his colleagues, 
His ability to capitalize on this, to appeal to his old 
friends, the senior members, for support, enabled him to 
become majority leader, via the position of whip. 
Thomas P. O'Neill 
Personal popularity, often an attx•ibute of people 
who achieve elected leadership positions, was one of Thomas 
68 
P. O'Neill's strongest points. In referring to O'Neill's 
campaign for the majority leadership, (after the disappearance 
and presumed death of Hale Boggs in 1972), O'Neill's hole-
. 94 
card. • • • was his popularity 1 deep-seated and w~despread. 11 
Additionally, Neil MacNeil speaks of O'Neill's many friends 
and feH enemies and his ability to be "unaffected by 
\1ashington power and social structure, of his ability to be 
as comfortable with presidents as with his colleagues, 1195 
Time Magazine, in a story on 0 1Neill said, 
For all his easy manner, O'Neill is a deeply 
ambitious man, a man completely confident of his 
ability to lead after his long years of experience 
in the House. In his early days, the Rules 
Committee was staemated by a split between conset'-
vatives and liberals. To get eny legislation he 
t----
supported moving, O'Neill learned House techniques or6 bargaining, bluffing, pleading and bargaining again.':! 
69 
0 1Neill had considered running earlier, in 1970-71, 
for the majority leadership, although he and his old friend, 
Edward Boland, could not decide which of them should do so,97 
As a result, each ended by supporting different candidates in 
that race, O'Neill supporting Boggs and Boland supporting 
Udall. Although this indicated a desire on the part of 
O'Neill to become a majority party leader, his personal 
request for the whip position 1-1as proof of this. 
Traditionally, the t~hip position had been an 
appointive office. After a brief attempt at making it an 
elected position, the caucus chose to return to the selection 
of an appointive whip. 0 1Neill, went immediately to Eoggs, 
reminding the latter of his support in the majority leader 
race, and asked Boggs to consider him for the whip position.97 
0 r Neill did not feel secure that; he t·IOuld be selected even 
after the formal request since there had been rumors that a 
more junior• member might be selected. 98 Hov1ever, O'Neill did 
receive the t~hip appointment and even though it is impossible 
to prove, it may have come about as a result of Car•l Albert's 
influence, who was kno1m to like O'Neill, Nevertheless, a 
particular skill was apparent here, that is, 0 1Neill's 
political intuitiveness in seeing the value of actively 
seeking and asking for the position. 
When O'Neill announced his candidacy for the majority 
leadership position in 1973, he conducted an extensive inside 
telephone campaign for that position, and received extensive 
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t early. 99 supper His only opposition •~as Sam Gibbons, a 
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Florida Southern liberal, who chose to run an issue-oriented 
campaign claiming a need for stronger leadership.100 Gibbons, 
in view of the strong support for O'Neill, eventually with-
dreH .from the race. Said Gibbons, "I know better than anyone 
that Tip doesn't have an enemy in the House. 11101 Gibbon's 
style of campaign had not been effective, although O'Neill's 
pel'Sonal popularity had probably been Gibbon's greatest 
stumbling block. Other members, namely, Hays of Ohio, Sisk 
o.f California, and Waggoner of Louisiana, had considered 
running against 0 1 Neill but felt he Hould be impossible to 
102 def'eat. 
O'Neill, as had the other leaders of' this period 
before hhn 1 had appealed to his friends, to the senior 
establishment;, in short, to those who t~ould be making the 
final selection. This was to be another example of an 
11 inside 11 campaign. O'Neill's combination of personal popu-
larity and ambition, his reputation for f'airness and his 
ability to persuade, and negotiate f'or his party accounted 
f'or his qualities o.f leadership. or these qualities, his 
popularity seemed to account most .for his ultimate selection 
as majority leader. There is no reason to believe, hoHever, 
that he would have been selected as his party 1 s whip had he 
not actively sought and requested it. Additionally, O'Neill, 
Hho had been a protege of l-fcCormack was likewise liked and 
respected by Albert who had helped in his initial selection 
. 103 
as whlp. Even without a public endorsement, thel'e is 
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little doubt that Albert wanted O'Neill as majority 
leader. 104 
John J • HcFall 
71 
After many years in Congress, certain party members 
find themselves in positions which may be stepping stones to 
higher leadership positions. Although in their early years 
in Congress, they may not have had aspirations for those 
positions, circumstances along the way made that possibility 
likely. John HcFall is an example of this type of leader.105 
Even though HcFall became a member of an important 
committee early in his career, there were not early signs 
that he made an extraordinary effort to push himself toward 
those activities that might make him visible and eligible for 
1 d hi i i 106 ea ers p pos t ons. Ho1-1ever, his strong party loyalty 
allowed him to be appointed as a zone whip, then deputy whip, 
and eventually majority whip. Other factors, as well as the 
above mentioned party loyalty, no doubt accounted for his 
appointment to the whip position. 
McFall has acknowledged that he was a protege of 
Carl Albert •107 This, in addition to his strong, loyal work 
in earlier leadership positions, is largely responsible for 
his appointment by O'Neill and Albert to that whip position. 
HcFall does not project an aggressive, outgoing 
personality and yet he has the reputation of being one of the 
more popt~lar members of the House with his colleagues •108 His 
popularity is not of the same kind as Albert's nor O'Neill's 
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who were moPe outspoken and well-knOl'm outside the House 
itself. Rather, he projects a quiet, confident manner, and 
he attributes his own popularity to the quiet way in which he 
does favors for his colleagues and the integrity of his word 
and behavior toward those who have known him for the 20 years 
that he has served,in the House. 
NcFall revised the many operations of the whip 
organization in order to enhance its usefulness to the party 
109 leaders. In so doing, not only did he prove himself to 
be a loyal party member snd loyal to party leaders, but 
placed himself in a highly visible position. Interviews with 
certain members of the majority party confirm this and sho~1 
that they applauded his efforts at making greater use of the 
111achinery of that office .D.O 
McFall has been criticized from time to time because 
of his lack of forcefulness and his relatively low profile.111 
!1cFall' s reaction to those criticisms is that he makes his 
opinions !mown where it counts, on the individual member-to-
member basis that has become so p1•evalent in the House. He 
stresses the point that it is the House of Representatives 
who select their leaders, not anyone outside that House. He 
is resentful of those who do not consider him to be a great 
. 112 intellect, another criticism heard from time to t1me. He 
decla1•es that he has devoted his energies to his district 
and to his role assisting the majority party leaders, and on 
this basis developed the experience a."1d expertise to qualify 
him for higher leadership positions. 
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\vi th the accidental death of Hale Boggs, Thomas 
0 'Neill was elected majority leader, leaving the whip position 
open. Both McFall and the other deputy whip, Jolm Brademus, 
realized that they might 
113 
have the opportunity to take O'Neill's 
place as vlhip. 
In 1973, when the effort was made to make the whip 
an elective office, both Brademus and McFall sensed the real 
possibility that the caucus rrlght approve such a resolution. 
They both immediately began a campaign to retain the 
appointive whip position. Additionally, both men campaigned 
with the possibility in mind that the position, if it became 
elective, might go to either one of them. 
Brademus conducted a more extensive campaign, 
perhaps beca.u.se he had few advantages, being younger and lesa 
popular than NcFall.. McFall made fewer phone calls and began 
his campaign later, but he eventually won.114 
The resolution for an elected whip.was defeated and 
McFall was chosen by O'Neill to be the whip. Peabody 
attributes this appointment to HcFall' s seniority 1 his 
greater popularity and the 
115 Hhich had backed McFall. 
size of the California delegation 
NcFall, himself, attributes 
116 
selection also to the influence of Speaker Albert. 
his 
McFall's selection as a party leader is indicative 
again of the importance of personal popularity, in whatever 
form that popularity may be. In his case, it 1·ms a popu-
larity gener•ally based on a quiet, likeable, honest manner, 
without the dynamism or the floor presence of an O'Neill or a 
Boggs. 
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Chapter 4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WHO CHALLENGED THE 
PARTY LEADERS AND FAILED 
Many of the individuals who challenged event;ual 
winners in majority party leadership contests between 1962 
and 1976 possessed cer_tain quali"Cies in conm10n with the 
winners. 1 This fact is especially significant because it is 
indicative that not only did party leadership winne~s have an 
impressive list of credentials 1 but the same 1vas true of 
those who chose to run against them. This confirms earlier 
res.earch on congressional leadership which asserts what might 
seem obvious to most students, namely, that selection within 
the majority party is a complex phenomenon. 
From 1962 until 1976, several majol•ity party members 
were involved in leadership contests characterized by a 
certain amount of suspense, yet resulting in no dramatic 
change of style. Only one contest, however, can be said to 
have kept members in suspense up until the final balloting, 
and that was the race for majority leader in 1970. This 
contest developed as the result of the announcement of 
retirement plans by Speaker John l!'lcCormack. The majority 
leader's position was to be vacated with the presumed advance-
ment of Carl Albert to the Speakership. 
Several members announced their plans to run for the 
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majority leadel' position, and it is these men \1hose 
characteristics will now be studied, Aside from Hale Boggs, 
the winner•, the men who ran were 11orris Udall of Arizona, 
James 0 1Ha.ra, Nichigan, B. J:". Sisk, California, and Wayne 
Hays of Ohio. In addition to these men, Richard Bolling made 
an attempt to stop the seemingly automatic eleva·tion of Carl 
Albert to the speakership in 1969 and his qualifications 
will be studied along with the others, The basic qualifi-
cations of the losers can be found in Table J, Additional 
information regarding the losers, which may be helpful in 
establishing their leadership potential begins below. 
~'1orris U d@ 
Udall, according to Peabody, was the leading 
contender to Hale Boggs throughout the entire campaign, 2 
This is significant _in view of the fact that Udall was the 
most junior of all of the contenders with only nine years of 
seniority. This was far below the average seniority of 
anyone who had held that office in the 20th century. Not 
only was Udall seeking the majority leader position, he had 
earlier challenged John I1cCormack for the spealtership (1969) 
with even less seniority, although Udall himse-lf acknovJledged 
that his effort was in protest to what he considered to be 
weak leadership. Nevertheless, there were indications that 
while his challenge to McCormack was applauded by some, it 
was deeply resented by the older, establishment members. 3 
The fact that his move 1~as resented at all is further indi-
cation of the demand for seniority that has been prevalent 
in the House. 
1-Jhile Udall lacked senior•i ty, he did not lack 
ambition. There is evidence that he entered the House with 
the hope of rising to the leadership someday.4 Even though 
his challenge to McCormack may have been a symbolic move, it 
is obvious that he had definite aspirations for leadership. 
His early candidacy for majority leader confirmed this. 
Udall was not a member of one of the prestigiotts 
committees, although this does not necessarily mean that the 
committees on which he served were not of his choice. His 
committees, Post Office and Civil Service, and Interior and 
Insular Affairs, were among the least sought after House 
committees, yet they may have represented Udall's interests ' 
and constituent needs. Udall, however, distinguished himself 
on these com1nittees by exhibiting admirable expertise.5 
As can be seen from both the Party Unity and 
Conservative Coalition Tables, Udall was a party loyal, a 
moderate, but relatively liberal. His membership in the 
Democratic Study Group, a House group composed of northern 
liberals, confirmed his interest in liberal, change-oriented 
6 legislation and procedures. 
None of the limited information on Udall gives any 
indication that his personality was objectionable aside from 
a reference to a kind of maoral sanctimony referred to 
earlier in this paper. It ls not difficult to infer that 
there may have been a kind of resentment at his rapid rise 
in the House of the sort that certai-n members felt to•1ard new 
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members, but there is no direct reference to this other than 
certain objections to his challenge to Speaker McCormack. 
It is known that he developed an extremely loyal following, 
7 
especially among younger, change-oriented members. 
In general, Udall gained quite a distinguished 
reputation in the House. Even though his qua).ifications were 
not in order, as were those of Boggs and older more senior 
members, it is true that his colleagues recognized his 
leadership ability. Lacking in the other qualities, it seems 
quite probably that it was this quality, leadership potential, 
that enabled Udall to provide Boggs with formidable opposition. 
His descl'ibed in this >1ay by Peabody: 
••• , he was widely regarded as one of the most 
articulate speakers in the House. Udall combined 
technical mastery of legislation 1-1ith a quick mind, 
a .vry, engaging sense of humor. All these qualities8 were prime requisites for a successful floor leader. 
It is clear, from other views presented by Peabody, 
that Udall was indeed change-oriented and seemed to feel a 
great dedication to interrupting those traditions of the 
House 1-1hich he felt were obstructing the effectiveness of the 
leadership and procedures of the House itself. This point he 
projected clearly, but it is not clear what he felt,. his 
chances were of succeeding in this. Obviously, in his 
campaign for the position, it was necessary for him to make 
an appeal to the newer and younger members whose loyalties 
were split between himself and James 0 1 Hara, another change-
or:i.entod liberal. Udall did make the effort to gain the 
support of these members and had he gained the support of as 
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many of them as he thought he had on his side, he might have 
VJon. In the end, however, it seems apparent that a signifi• 
cant number of those members VJent to the side of Boggs. 
In the light of VJhat some might consider to be 
naivete on the part of Udall in presuming that he could VJin 
a leadership contest with his own junior status, (he could 
have qualified for the 1-1hip position with his seniority), the 
case could be made for criticizing his inability to sense the 
temper of the House and being unwilling to wait for some 
future time when the likelihood of his winning might have 
been more real. Nevertheless, the fact remains that he was 
Boggs' greatest threat and remained so until the end. Because 
of his premature aspirations, he may have spoiled future 
chances for a leadel'ship position if House members should 
choose to 11 pm1ish11 him for his presumptuous behavior. 
In general, however, of all of the candidates for 
the majority position during that year, Udall clearly stands 
out as being the candidate possessing the greatest leadership 
potential, using the same criteria for that qualification 
that were used earlier for the party leaders.9 
Richard BolliE£; 
Of all of the candidates who ran for party leader-
ship positions and lost who are being studied in this paper, 
Richard Bolling had, perhaps, more basic qualifications in 
order than any of the other members. He had adequate 
seniority, 22 years of service in the House, had been a 
protege of Sam Rayburn, served on the Rules comrr1ittee, was an 
-~----- ~ 
86 
intellectual, an expert on the operation and function of the 
Congress, had gained much leadership exper•ience while serving 
~1ith Rayburn, and was respected for his great knm·lledge and 
expertise in many areas of legisla·i;ion. In addition to these 
qualities, Bolling had been a loyal party member although he 
made numerous suggestions to modernize the operation of the 
House and the majority party which may have ultimately 
offended his colleagues.10 If nothing else, it was indicative 
of his being ch<mge-oriented as opposed to being pu~ely an 
establishment member. 
With all of his obvious qualifications, Bolling 
lacked the ability to rally majority party members to his 
side becattse of a personality which offended rather than 
impressed his colleagues •11 Personality, as a quality 1r1hich 
has been considered part of leadership potential here, seemed 
to be the single greatest handicap of Richard Bolling, 
although in no 1t1ay can it be said that it erased all of his 
leadership abilities, His personality simply seemed to have 
prevented him from exercising the influence that his other 
leadership qualities might have allowed him to pursue. 
Follo1t1ing are some comments of his colleagues which, vlhile 
they do not necessarily describe his personality, do reflect 
certain personality characteristics as perceived by those who 
worked with him, ru•d they confirm his abilities in other 
areas: 
Bolling loves the House. He loves it and has 
studied it. He has read everything that has been 
written about the House and has studi~d its power 
structure, He has a brilliant mind. 
t:---
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I dare you to find a member of Congr~ss who 
said Bolling had lifted a finger for him. J 
Bolling's got a sort of chip on his shoulder. 14 
The thing you have to realize about Bolling is 
that he never bothers to speak to anyone else. I 
don't think Bolling understands politics.l5 
Despite a good deal of char'm, Bolling just does 
not have a personalitl6that inspi.res loyalty and friendship among men. 
Bolling's chief disadvantage, his personality, 
surely kept him from acquiring leadership positions. The 
combination of this and the fact that he might have been 
considered more a change-oriented party member than an 
establishment member (he authored two books 1-hich wel•e 
critical of the Rouse operations) placed him in a personally 
fr11strating position in terlllS of his own leadership 
e.spiratlons. fulling was, however, a loyal party member if 
the Party Unity scor-es are a true indication of this even 
though his scores are not as impressive as those of the 
party leaders. 
Bolling's appeal to 11 outside" sources during his 
campaign for the Speakership, cited by Polsby, did not 
compete effectively with Albert's 11 inside 11 efforts. However, 
it is doubt;ful if the nature of his campaign was the true 
reason for his defeat, considering the adverse reaction of so 
many of his colleagues to his personality and his recommen-
dations for change. It may be that he conducted this outside 
campaign with the knowledge that it might provide his 
greatest hope for achieving a leadership position. 
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\'layne_.tl_?-1.~ 
It is doubtf'ul that ltlayne Hays of Ohio was ever 
considered a serious contender for majority leader in 1970 by 
anyone .but himsel:r. 17 While possessing considerable 
seniority, 22 years of' service, Hays was in line f'or the 
chai:r•manship of' the Committee on House Administration ~~hich 
he considered a suitable alternative if' he lost the majority 
leader race. "Either Hay I couldn't lose"~8 declared Hays, 
from which can be inferred that he would not be deeply 
saddened by a def'eat in the ma,iority leader race. 
Hays 1 scores in the Party Unity and Conservative 
Coalition Tables indicate a conservatism bordering on 
questionable party loyalty Hhich no doubt placed him in a 
precarious position. By the broadest interpretation he could 
have been considered a moderate, but his scores in both 
instances clearly show conservative leanings. 
Hays' biggest drawback Has in the area of' leader-
. 19 
ship potential. Far from being the most popular of the 
candidates, he was, in f'act, openly detested by some of' his 
colleagues. This handicap made the likelihood of' his success 
tn winning quite remote considering the fact that many votes 
1-1e:r•e needed as a base of' support in a race with so many 
contenders. There is evidence that Hays found certain of 
his colleagu.es distasteful in turn, since by his own 
acknowledgement, he chose to run f'or majority leader because 
of his dissatisfaction with the slate of candidates. Of Hay~ 
Peabody says: 
=----
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Possessor of one of the most caustic vlits and 
sharpest tongues in the House, Hays 1 style of floor 
debating aad yielded several converts and not .a fel-l 
enemies,2 
Not all of Hays 1· caustic one-minute speeches 
on the floor earned admirers. Hare than one Democrat, 
with scars hardly healed, Hould remember and put Hays 
near the bottom of his ovm list2£f preferred candidates for majority leadei'. 
Hays, Hho conducted his campaign among the regular 
establishment conservative-to-moderage members, did so Hith 
an attitude expressed by his statement: 
I 1m not asking connni tments from any members, I 
say to them-- 11 I'd like to have your vote, but I don't 
expect anything in writing or in blood," On the 
basis of th~~· quite a few people have said they'll 
support me, . . 
However, later in his campaign he threatened members with, 
"Would you rather have me as a happy majority leader or an 
un.11appy Chairman of House Administration? 1123 The method 
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Hays used of inviting potential supporters to luncheons 
where they could hardly openly deny him support, h01~ever 1 
failed to achieve the desired result in the final protection 
of the secret ballot. 
Hays, hardly popular, did not appear to have a 
record of active flooi' management or extra activities that 
made him as eligible as other more dedicated majority party 
members. He had held no previous party positions,24 
B. F, Sisk 
B. F. Sisk, like Hays, was one of the more conser-
vative of the candidates for the majority leadership, Both 
voted fe1~er times with their party than their Novthern 
r._::: ___ _ 
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Democratic colleagues, although Sisk's voting record, in 
opposition to the conservative coalition, t;as very close to 
Boggs 1 • 
Sisk 1 s seniority hardly placed him in a desirable 
position, with only 16 years of service in the House at the 
time he chose to run for majority leader, although in that 
time he had managed to rise to within six places from the 
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25 top on the Rules Committee.. This indicated early appoint-
ment to that committee. Additionally, Sisk served on the 
Agriculture Committee, a departure from a tradition 11hich 
generally bru.'s anyone vlho serves on one of the three 
exclusive committees from serving on any other committee. 
Sisk had been impressive in his floor management of 
certain of his pet bills, and he had also had a reputation 
fo.r helping grant .favors to certain members on request, 
Peabody says: 
As a member of the powerful scheduling group, 
Sisk had been in a position to do favors for members, 
sometimes by voting .for a rule, o·cher times by helping 
to bottle up legislation which a majority o.f members 
did not wish to see come to the floor, Finally, Sisk 
had done a co~nendable job of floor managing; the 
controve.rsial Legislatfve Reorganization Act o.f 1970 
through to its final passage, Dealing with many of 
the most complicated internal matters o.f the House, 
methods of voting, staffing and possible changes in 
seniority, the calm, sloH-talking Californian 
placated the senior pmver-Hielders in the House, and 
at the same time brought about enough changes to 
satisfy ~~1 but the most re.form-oriented younger 
members, 
As impressive as 'Chis may have seemed, hoHever, 
there was a lack of consensus as to Sisk's leadership 
ability, In question Has his futt~e ability to be a spokes-
man for his party, a desirable, if not necessary, 
l_ 
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qualification for a party leader. This vias surely a serious 
drawback considering that the majority party had leaders with 
Slsk 1 s basic qualifications and >-;ho were, in addition, adept 
at speaking and presenting the party's policies. 
Sisk, additionally, had been a member of' the whip 
organization, being a zone whip, not without its advantages 
L'1 a leadership race. 27 H01vever I this did not help in his 
eff'ort to make inroads among the southerners whose support 
he hoped for and needed, the southerners being the more 
conservative members. More votes than Sisk could spare went 
to Hale Boggs. 28 
In summary, Sisk's greatest handicaps were his 
personal image, not being a strong, aggressive personality, 
his lack of consistent floor activity, and his lack of a 
strong undivided power base. 
James O'Hara 
As the Tables show, James O'Hara lacked adequate 
seniority, prestigious committee membership and Has considered 
by some to be too liberal and change-oriented. The latter 
characteristic was manifested in O'Hara's chairmanship of the 
Democratic Study Group and his liberal and vigorous acti-
vities as a spokesman for labor, educational and civil rights 
causes.29 However, he was thought by many to be one of the 
two or three most competent legislators in the fields of 
labor and civil rights and Has also known to be an expert in 
legislative tactics.3° Peabody says of O'Hara: 
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Not all o.f 0 r Hara r s assets, hoHever, >Jere readily 
transferable into leadership support. First, he had 
to compete with Udall for most o.f the change-oriented 
votes in the House. As the long summer extended into 
the .fall, 0 1Hara discovered that many o.f the votes he 
hoped for had been pre-empted by his Arizona colleague, 
Second, O'Hara's strong positions o.f labor and civil 
rights issues made him an anathema to most southerners. 
Further, many conservatives, including some big city-
machine congressmen, resented O'Hara's liberal stance 
on education, social wel.fare, and issues of party 
pressures that O'Hara could bring to bear proved to 
be rather ineffective in a contest decided by secret 
ballot voting.31 
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0 'Hara was not a real "member r s member" in the sense 
that he did not make the activities of the House his .foremost 
interest in life, a quality often considered a disadvantage 
for potential leaders. He had the reptttation for being a 
i'atnily man and was jealous of extra time t;hat those activities; 
required that took him away from his .family life. Of this 
Peabody says, "For these and other reasons O'Hara was probably 
the most ambivalent of all of the candidates about staying in 
the race" .32 
O'Hara ran a 11 low-key"- campaign much of the_ time 
which confirms Peabody's observation of 11is rather ambivalent 
attitude. He probably appealed to "outside 11 sources more 
than the other candidates, actively seeking the support of 
the AFL-CIO and other labor, education, and civil rights 
groups.33 
There is evidence that suggests that O'Hara's 
liberal, reform-oriented philosophies were a disadvantage to 
him, and in addition to this, his sometimes caustic tongue 
earned him enemies. Even though he was respected as being 
forthright, though sharp tongued, it has become increasingly 
i-
t 
--~~ 
94 
evident that a potential party leader suffers from such a 
lu.xu.ry. 
--~--
NOTES 
Chapter 4 
1. The lL~ited amount of information on the members referred 
to in this chapter makes it necessary to repeatedly 
refer to Peabody's extensive research in the area of 
leadership. 
2. Robert Peabody, Leadership in Congress, pp. 211-212. 
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Udall 69 
Sisk 31 
Hays 28 
O'Hara 25 
The scores at the·end of the balloting were: 
Boggs l~g Udall 
Sisk 17 
An additional reference which referred to the close 
contest and to the effort, in particular, of Morris 
Udall was, Larry L. King, 11The Road to Power in Congress: 
The Education of Mo Udall--and What it Cost • 11 Harper's 
242, June, 1971, pp. 39-63. 
3• Peabody, Ibid., p. 164. Peabody said of Udall's 
challenge to the Speaker 1 
However, Udall's forced confrontation \vith the 
Speaker was not \vithout liabilities. Not only 
did he earn the ire of McCormack, Udall also 
made it difficult for himself to gain subsequent 
support from older colleagues ••• • 
4• Ibid., P• 163. 
5. Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress, Morris Udall, 
p. 9. 
6. l'lark F, Ferber, 11 The Formation of the Democratic Study 
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Thepe Has much early speculation that Sisk had actually 
captured certain Southern votes that Boggs needed, but 
this was appapently a pre-mature vieH,' This was the 
basic content of the articles by RoHland Evans and Robert 
Novak, "Slipped Sisk, 11 in the Washin&_ton Post, Dec • 20 1 
1970. . 
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O'Hara and Udall both received the "blessings" of the 
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Chapter 5 
A CONPARISON OF THE WINNERS AND LOSERS 
Common Characteristics of Both Groups 
Table 3 sh01vs in brief form the characteristics or 
qualifications that lvere shared by both the vlinners and 
losers. From this table, it c~ be seen that all members who 
Here candidates for party leadership positions betHeen 1962 
and 1976, without exception, shared the following qualifi-
cations: (1) In party unity scores, which indicate the degree 
of party loyalty, all potential leaders and selected leaders 
scored at least as high or higher than the party average 
scores, thus indicating at least an average degree of party 
loyalty; ( 2) All scored as high or higher than the party 
average in conservative coalition scores; however, not all 
scored as high as the average for Northern Democrats; (3) All 
Here active in the extra activities of the House; (4) All 
exhibited some sort of legislative expertise in their 
particular area of interest. 
The above characteristics are the only qualities 
both groups shared. It is accurate to say that they shared 
these qualifications in varying degrees, that is, certain 
individuals were more prominent in a given area than others, 
but in general, these particular qualifications were likely 
to be in order. 
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Differences in the THo GJ:>oups 
lfuile all of the party leaders studied had 
accumulated sizeable senioJ:>ity, the losers had not. In the 
case of the losers, Wayne Hays and Richard Bolling wel:'e the 
only candidates who had sufficlent seniority to meet those 
standards, fol' the positions they sought, that had existed 
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in the entiJ:>e 20th century. Although it must be understood 
that there was no formal requiJ:>ement for such a standard, the 
fact is that its existence over a long time period established 
its importance and significance as a qualification. 
The party unity scores of the party leaders (the 
winners) were all considerably above the party average, 
indicating a strong loyalty on the part of the leaders. The 
average majority party member voted with the majoJ:>ity or 
dominant Hing of the party 64,: of the time, vlhile the average 
for the party leaders was 86%, Hith no leader voting under 
85% of the time Hith his party. 
For the losers, the average score Has 74%, this. 
being the percentage of the time they voted Hith the majority 
of the party. Although this indicates strong party loyalty, 
it must be noted that Hays, voted 64% of the time with the 
majority of his party, or the same as the party average. 
The conservative coalition scores, Hhich show the 
number of times a member votes aganist that coalition, reveal 
that the average score for the party leaders was 81%, while 
those of the losers was only 68%. The average for the 
Northern Democrats was 69%. Bolling's score was 68%, 
r::_ --
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Hays 53%, and Sisk 57%, scores 11hich confirm their relative 
conservatism. 0 1Hara and Udall both had scores equal to or 
r.d.gher than the party leaders. 
The numbers that have been compared here, while 
they sho1-1 wide divergences, may r•epresent more moderateness 
than the actual numbers indicate, or they may do just the 
opposite. They may not represent the "feeling" that indivi-
dual members have regarding the ideolog-y of their colleagues. 
On the ot;her hand, those individuals whose scores represented 
a conservative moderateness may have lost their races because 
their colleagues actually vie;-1ed them as being too censer-
vative, whereas the more liberal losers' scores were not 
drastically different scores than those of the party leaders, 
yet they were often thought to be mOl'e liberal than some of 
the party leaders. It is of' interest to note here that 
Udall's score, 82%, was considerably higher than the man 11ho 
defeated him, yet his score 1-1as closer to the party leaders' 
average. The significance of Udall's ideology and party 
loyalty will be discussed later in its relationship to his 
being Boggs' closest contender. 
In the area of committee membership, all of the 
leaders served on prestigious committees Hhile only three of 
the losers served on such cormnittees. In addition to commit-
tee membership, only one loser Rerved previously in the 1-1hip 
organization, while all of the leaders had served as majority 
whip. 
Of equal significance is the fact that all of the 
----~ 
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party leaders had served as pl'Otegas of a member Hho had 
bean or 1vas clU'rently the Speaker of the House. Only one 
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loser, Richard Bolling, had served such an apprenticeship. 
Albert, Bolling and Boggs had been singled out for attention 
by Speaker Rayburn 1-1hile 0 'Neill had been close to John 
HcCormack, and John HcFall Has a favorite of Carl Albert. 
IJhile the other losers may have Horked closely Hith other 
senior party members, none of the li teratlU'e reveals a 
1 protege of apprenticeship status. 
All of the party leaders seemed to have possessed 
such qualities as personality, floor presence, political 
skill and acumen, and personal popularity 1 to the degree that 
they were thought to rate high in leadership potential, 
qualifying them for selection. There Has some question, 
however, that Hale Boggs, at least during his later years, 
possessed that popularity to the extent that had been true 
earlier in his career. 
The losers, on the other hand, nearly all suffered 
from either lack of personal popularity, or aggressive 
leadership qualities. Only Morris Udall stood out as 
possessing those two qualities, however, the case might be 
made for criticizing his judgement in failing to understand 
the importance of ti•aditional qualifications to many majority 
party members, especially those senior members Hho were 
establishment oriented. 
Analysis of the Differences 
The greatest difficulty in comparing the 
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qualifications of' the vJinners and losel'S is v-1eighing those 
dif'fel•ences in an effort to detemine \·Jhich quali·ties might; 
have actually accounted for one candidate's victory and the 
other 1 s loss. There are, h01·1ever, certain common denomina-
tors that have clearly emerged as having been present which, 
while they were not responsible by themselves :for victory or 
def'eat, nevertheless combined with certain other qualities 
and accounted for the eventual outcome. Therefore, it can be 
said that in order to be selected for a majority party 
leadership position beb·Jeen 1962 and 1976, the following 
qualifications. seemed to have been more important than others: 
(1) seniority, (2) being an establishment member, as opposed 
to being change-oriented, (3) having served as majority whip, 
(lj.) having been a protege or an apprentice of the Speaker of 
the House and (5) having been a moderate and a strong party 
member. 
These qualifications or common denominators emerged 
as having been of greatest importance because of the 
following reasons: (1) each of the party leaders selected 
during that period, 1962-1976, had all of the above qualifi-
cations, (2) •~hile all of the losers possessed many or most 
of the qualifications that were established earlier as 
criteria for selection for majority party leadership 
positions, it remains that; not a single one of the losers 
possessed all of the above qualities. 
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NOTES: 
Chapter 5 
1. Richard Fenno, 11 The Seniority-Protege-Apprentice System 
in -t;he House of Representatives" in Polsby and Peabody's 
Yf.ew Perspectives on the House of Representatives.. Fenno 
discusses the protege system in its relationship to 
party leadership selection. 
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Chapter 6 
LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN 1'HE COLLEGIAL STYLE: 
EVIDENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
1962-1976 
The majority party leaders who were selected during 
the period, 1962-1976, have been shown to have had certain 
characteristics in common that set them apart from. other 
majority party members and enabled them to be selected for 
those positions. Further, those majority party members who 
challenged those leaders were unsuccessful because they did 
not possess the five significant qualifications that proved 
to be necessary for selection. 
The qualifi.cations that were found to have been 
necessary for party leadership selection during this period 
show a pattern of adherence to a status quo, or an observance 
of traditions that grevJ and became s.tabilized dur•ing this 
period. They also represented a formidable obstacle which 
the challengers for leadership positions found impossible to 
penetrate. 
A review of those qualifications which were charac-
teristic of party leaders will reveal that each quality, by 
itself, was symptomatic of t;he sustaining reverence for those 
values which fed a process of institutionalization. It is 
this fact, asserting itself repetitiously upon the leadership 
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selection process, Hhich distinctly colored the collegial 
style of leadership during this period. 
105 
It bears repeating here that each one of the winners 
possessed all of the five, final qualifications vlhich were 
found to be unique to the party leaders. Each of their 
challengers had, at most, three of the five qualifications. 
Hhat is even more significant here, however, is that one 
qualification, leadership potential, although of immense 
importance to the selection process, as a final qualification 
it appeared that, in certain instances, it Has not of the 
greatest significance. This may be credited largely to the 
fact that the nature of the collegial style itself diminished 
its importance as an essential qualification and certain 
other qualities more necessary to that style simply super-
seded it. 
It must be inserted here that Peabody consistently 
referred to the personal popularity of individual leaders as 
being of importance when accompanied by the member's belief 
in his oHn ability to lead.1 Peabody refers to leadership 
potential as being that quality that 11winnowsn out most of 
the remaining members from possible competition from leader-
ship positions.2 Yet, in this paper, leadership potential, 
which is ackno;-1ledged as being of critical importance as a 
criterion for selection, and certainly Has undoubtedly 
responsible for 11Hinnowing 11 out other individuals, neverthe-
less failed to be a final factor in at least tHo races 
between 1962 and 1976. 
---~--
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The first instance where leadership potential might 
have been secondary to institutional criteria was in the case 
of Jolm McCormack. However, one is impressed, from general 
reading, of the questionable popularity and leadership ability 
of l'llcCormack yet, at the time of' Rayburn's death it was 
assumed that McCormack 1s long years as majority leader had 
earned him the right to the speakership. One would be pressed 
to prove that his personal popularity or other leadership 
qualities were the reasons for his selec·tion.3 
The election of' Hale Boggs as majority leader in 
1970 is another example of the reverence toward traditional 
and institutional qualifications that have been evident in the 
majority party. A Udall victory, in view of his lack of' 
seniority, would have threatened a long tradition and 
undoubtedly Hould have made establishment members uncomf'ol'-
table. In that election, the questionable emotional stability 
of Boggs vias not a serious enough threat, although his 
behavior appeared quite suspect, to override his long tenure 
of' loyal party service, his once dynamic leadership ability, 
and his occupation of' the office of' whip.4 
There is a danger of over-simplification in the 
instances referred to above. Reviewing a member's qualif'i-
cations from the pages of a book may be severely inadequate 
in determining qualifications or assessing personalities. 
Nevertheless, the restraints on potential leaders that have 
cuu[~..'(' .. ..{ 
_ ..... - "··'·~- . ~eveolved'lin the House of Representatives appear to be 
institutional restraints to a degree greater than might have 
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been perceived by one whose analysis of party leadership is 
oriented tov~ard the "hmnan" qualities in the selection of 
leaders. This by no means must be interpreted as an impli-
cation that "leadership potential" is not of inordinate 
significance. Its importance is a recurring theme in the 
study of leadership selection. \ihat is being emphasized 
here is that, although leadership potential is a qualifi-
cation that limited the munber of those who might have been 
eligible for leadership positions, it did not appear to be 
the determining qualification in all leadership contest from 
1962 to 1976. 
It must be acknowledged that all of the qualities 
that were found to have been necessary for leadership 
selection during the period under study were not unique to the 
collegial style, nor t-Jere they all peculiar only to the 
majority party. The first qualification, for example, 
seniority, is a phenomenon found to be necessary for many 
positions in the entire Congress of the United States. 
Secondly, the elevation of the majority leader to the Speaker-
ship occurred during periods of other leadership styles as 
well as during this period of collegial style leadership. 
Thirdly, the period of 1962-1976 was certainly not the only 
period in the history of the House when the leaders tended 
to be loyal to party or were found to be moderates. If we 
were to include 111eadership potential" in the list, again, 
that would not be considered a characteristi.c of style only. 
There were then, two qualifications remaining which 
s __ _ 
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vwre fow:td to have existed during this period of collegial 
style leadership, and it is the presence of those qualifi-
cations which support the major hypothesis of this paper 
which is that: It was the nature of the collegial style which 
created and allot-led an insti tu·cionalization of the leadership. 
selection process, a process which was sustained by the 
requirements of that style, 
The two remaining qualifications vJhich were unique 
to the collegial style were: (1) the member had been either 
in the whip organization or had been majority whip, and (2) 
the member had been a protege or had been endorsed by the 
Speaker of the House. 
The role of the whip organization fu'ld the sub::Jequent 
selection of leaders from that organization is perhaps the 
most significant development which occurred in the majority 
party during the collegial period.5 Its growing ~aportance 
during the past twenty years VJas a natural outgrowth of .a 
style of leadership specifically ordered by John McCormack 
Hhen he replaced Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the House in 1962. 
Speaker Rayburn had served in many instances as hi::J own whip, 
having been remarkably intuitive in those areas which the 
present day whip organization serves. S:peaker HcCormack, Hho 
made no pretense of his own ability to duplicate Rayburn's 
perceptiveness, called for a cooperative or collegial effort 
which tvould require the coordination of the Speaker, 
majority leader, and majority tvhip in the planning and 
~nplementation of majority party policies. Evidence suggests 
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that this prompted a more active role fol' the ~~hip and 
increased activity for the numerous deputy and zone whips. 
According to Ripley, "The Democratic \fuip organization has 
become the focus of a corporate or collegial leadership in 
6 the House." 
There is evidence that the resources of the whip 
organization became more necessary as the majority party 
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represented an increasingly diverse and desperate electorate 
whose needs called for continuous co~~unication with the 
leadership. This further emphasized and justified the 
growing responsibilities of the whip organization. 
The growth of the whip organization then was the 
logical result of its increased need by the leadership style 
of the period, (1962-1976). As the leaders found it neces-
sary to coordinate, cooperate and plan strategy in order to 
achieve greater success in legislative planning, the whip 
organization provided the machinery with which to accomplish 
these goals. The traditional role of the whip and his 
organization did not need to be altered, only activated and 
expanded, to provide necessary services. That machinery, set 
in motion, became the communication between the leadership 
and the members, the purveyor of facts, of opinions, of will. 
The recent study by Ripley suggests that during this period 
of leadership, this machinery did, indeed, become more active 
to the degree that it also became the core of increased party 
7 
activity and unity. 
The whip has traditionally been an appointive 
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position, as have the assistant whips. The choices for these 
positions, made by the Speaker and majority leader, have 
reasonably been those members in whom the leaders have had 
the greatest confidence. They were loyal pal'ty members with 
a demonstrated dedication to majority party policies, and 
were from regions that would provide an appropriate balance 
in the leadership hierarchy. To presume that the leaders 
would not choose members for these positions whose demonstrated 
loyalty they could be assured of, vlould be unrealistic. 
Their loyalty and dedication to the leadership would guarantee 
collegial leadership success. 
The subsequent performance of the appointed \~hips, 
their experience and tested dedication, placed them in advan-
tageons, highly visible positions for conti.nuing on to higher 
leadership roles. They had not only learned elements of the 
leadership process, but had become experienced practitioners 
of a complex style. 
If any further evidence is needed to establish the 
increased importance and status of the whip during tlus 
period, it can be found in the tv10 recent attempts to convert 
the appointed whip position into an elected majority party 
position. In 1973 and 197.5, resolutions appeared before the 
Democratic Caucus which called for this change, but which, 
8 both times were defeated. 
The reason for the proposed resolutions ~~as 
relatively simple. The seeming ease Hith which the whip was 
elevated to majority leader had hardly gone unnoticed and 
l:L 
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there were increasing protests tovmrd a system in 1o1hich the 
tvJO top majority party leaders were essentially charged vlith 
choosing the future Speaker of the House.9 Offended members 
demanded a voice in the selection of a leader whose immediate 
and ultimate importance had suddenly become conspicuous. 
The resolutions were defeated largely because of the 
subtle influence of the majority leader both times. Indi-
cations are that he feared the election of a less than loyal 
member who could conceivably develop an independence 
destructive to the collegial style of leadership. 10 The 
majority leader's protest that he needed "his own man" in 
that position to assure absolute loyalty and c ooperation1 met 
vlibh the approval of the caucus. 
This attitude on the part of the majority leader 
provides valuable insight into the general reluctance of the 
majority party members to select other thru1 establishment 
members for their leaders; it cautions members of the possible 
adverse effects on the quality and effectiveness of a leader-
ship group chosen recklessly without regard to political or 
ideological compatibility. 
The pattern which developed during this collegial 
style period, whereby the majority whip was elevated to 
majority leader, was interrupted in 1976 when John McFall 
i'ailed in his effort to become majority leader. This fact, 
hov1ever, does not necessarily negate evidence of the existence 
of inst.itutionalization during the 1962-1976 leadership 
period, There is reason to believe, however, that unusual 
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ci.rcumstru"lces heretofore absent in the leadership selection 
of this period are responsible for McFall's defeat_. McFall 
had acknowledged the acceptance of certain gifts and money 
from a foreign government and had chosen to withhold this 
fact until af·!;er the congressional election in his district, 11 
Additionally, there was considerable criticism of his general 
handling of the episode (first denying it, then admitting it) 
which might have had a two fold effect on his chances in the 
leadership race: (1) the practical possibility that he 
might not be returned to Congress after the ne.xt election, 
and (2) his selection might reflect a 11permissive 11 attitude 
on the part of his colleagues, 
McFall's colleague, James lifright of Texas, who was 
elected to that position had liket-~ise been in the whip 
organization as a zone whip thus satisfying that qualifi-
12 
cation, The new, establishment oriented majority leader's 
other qualifications are not included in this paper; however, 
it may be significant to mention that he was selected over a 
change-oriented, libel•al candidate known to have been in 
disfavor Hith the new Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill, 
Conclusion 
There were certain qualifications that a majority 
party member needed in order to be selected for a leadel•ship 
position during ·che pel'iod, 1962-1976, Numerous members of 
the majority party possessed many of these same qualities, 
but only those members whose qualifications were approprlate 
to the collegial style of leadership during that pe:l."iod were 
-----
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successful in achieving leadership posl.tions. 
Many of the qualifications studied here were 
traditl.onal characteristics of party leaders not unique to 
the collegial style. There were certain requirements of that 
style, however, that influenced and institutionalized the 
selection process. Foremost among these requirements was the 
need for the increased activity and participation of the 
majority whip in the leadership planning of the majority 
party. 'rhe subsequent enlargement of the role of the whip 
made the selec·t;ion of that leader of, critical importance to 
the Speaker and majority leader. Their own requirement that 
he be loyal to them and to their legislative strategy, made 
it desirable for them to choose one in whom they had the 
most confidence. This resulted in the selection of one of 
their proteges or favorltes. 
After years of loyal service to the majority party, 
the whip, or members of his organization, became an essential 
part of the leadership hierarchy and their abilities and 
experience were acknowledged by their selection for higher 
leadership positions. Thus, the perpetuation of the colle-
gial style became the pattern for the period of 1962-1976. 
Leadership selection during that period was institutionalized 
because of the basic requirements of the style. 
This institutionalization process met with challenge 
from time to time, as the resolution calling for an elected 
whip shows. In the future, this discontentment may result in 
a successful challenge to the collegial style. If the 
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change-oriented members increase their numbers to the degree 
that they can successfully 11 out-vote 11 the establishment 
members, a new style of leadership may occur. The selection 
of one change-oriented leader could conceivably interrupt the 
style to the degree that an era of the "single-leader" style 
might reappear. Much will depend on the political climate of 
the future; if the Democratic Party continues to be the 
majority party, members may be satisfied with the collegial 
style of leadership. In the event of a drrunatic change in 
the voting patterns of the American people, the Democratic 
Party may seek to mend the problems by a change in leader-
selection and methods. 
r:-
r=- --
~-
'p---== 
NOTES 
Chapter 6 
1. Peabody, ~dership in Congress, p. 473. 
2, Ibid, 
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t•ri tings carry this theme, Randall Ripley, 11 Party Whip 
Organizations", in Nelson Polsby 1 s congressional 
Behavior, pp. 225-248. 
6, Ibid., p. 239. 
7, Ibid., p. 241, 
8, Peabody, PP• 249-255. 
9. Ibid, 
10, Ibid., p. 256. 
11. Stockton Record, (Dec. 9, 1976), 
12. San Francisco Chronicle, (Dec, 12, 1976), p. 13. 
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EXPLJ\.NA'riON OF CRITERIA USED IN COHPARING 
LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS 
- Minimum requirement 8 Yl'S, before selection as 
whip, 
Hinimum requirement 12 yrs, before selection as 
majority leader, 
l'iinimum 1.5 y1•s. requirement before selection as 
Speaker. 
AGE- At least 40 yrs. of age before entering the House. 
P.AI1TY UNITY~ORES - Member voted with the majority of his 
party at least 70% of the time on roll 
call votes. · 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES - Member voted against the 
Conservative Coalition at least 6.5% of 
the time on roll call votes, 
MODERATENESS - JY!ember is not identified tvith the extreme wing 
of his party. i.e. is not considered an 
extreme liberal of extreme conservative, Did 
not vote more than 90% of the time with the 
majority of his party, or did not vote less 
than JO% of the time against the Conservative 
Coalition. 
COH!1ITT~ Served on one of the exclusive or semi-exclusive 
committees beginning by at least his 3rd term in 
the House. 
rgoTEGE STATUS - Served as a protege of a leader who either 
was or was to become the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, 
EXPERTISE - ivas recognized by colleagues as being an expert 
in at least one area of legislation. 
PERSONAL POPUL..tJ.RITY - Generally well-lilmd by an estimated 
-- three-fourths of colleagues, 
EX'rHA-ACTIVITIES ., Served in some capacity other than as a 
member of a standing committee. 
FLOOR DEBATE EFFECTIVENESS - Recognized by colleagues as 
being effectively persuasive and creditable 
on the floor of the House. 
SUPPORT OF SPEAKER - Either privately or publicly endorsed or 
encouraged in campaign for leadership 
position, 
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~-~B~IZATION - Served in some capacity. 
ESTABLISHl'lENT HElmER - Did not actively seek reform in 
established traditions in the collegial 
style. 
CHANGE-ORIENTE£ - Actively sou~<t reform in the leadership 
style during period of candidacy. 
ACCEPTIBILITY OF PERSONALITY - Absence of oi'i'ensive behavior. 
LEADERSHIP AHBITION - Indicated desire to be a party leader 
early in career. 
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Table 1 
PARTY UNITY SCORE& 
(Percentage o.f times member voted :l.n agreement with the majority o:f his party) 
Congresses (1963-68) Congresses (1969-74) 
89th 89th 90th Average 9lst 92nd 93rd Average 
Carl Albert 89 81 94 88 79 X X X 
Hale Boggs 93 91 94 86 71 69 71-l:- 70 
Thomas P. O'Neill 90 78 83 83 81 83 83 82-
John HcFall 96 94 91 93 79 64 80 74 
Party Averages 71 67 63 67 .59 61 62 60 
+ 
x became Speaker 
" incomplete 
·--lllllf·.'·. --~, j'.""_ '11 r::'li .. ' ' ''"' '''I I' 'I I, '',r_--,,,,i],_i .,_llli 'l!_''' .. _i'_P '',i 
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Table 2 
. CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES 
(Percentage of times member voted against the coalition) 
Congresses (1963-68) 
89th 89th 90th 
Carl Albert 69 69 76 
Hale Boggs 70 82 64 
Thomas P. O'Neill 74 77 86 
John McFall CJ5 92 84 
Northern 
Democrats 75 77 69 
Republicans 22 16 22 
Sonthern 
Democrats 25 26 18 
x became Speaker 
" incomplete 
·~ . i~~m~~ ... , ··,1· ~~· . "'I :u:;:-= 1 :JLII r,,' 
I' j:': 
Average 
68 
72 
79 
87 
74 
20 
23 
Congresses (1969-74) 
9lst 92nd 93rd Average 
.54 X X X 
51 51 54'~ 52 
79 77 74 77 
61 50 6}. 58 
63 65 67 65 
18 18 22 19 
17 20 26 21 
Total averages for 1963-1974: 
PARTY LEADERS : 69 
NORTHERN DE!'!OS: 69 
ALL DEl·! OS: 46 
' I Dffill'l' i 1: ill" ::lii'il'll:~r~~,~]fl' · lllil!l ' I I' I 
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Table 3 
QUALITIES OF PARTY LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS CONSIDERED AS ASSESTS 
LEADERS 
Carl Albert X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
' H<:tle Boggs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
I 
Thomas P. O'Neill X· X X X X X X X X X X X X 
.Jor..n McFall X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
I 
CHALLENGERS 
Richard Bolling X X X X X X X X X X X X X Norris Udall X X X X X X X Bo F. Sisk X X X X X X 
.T olm 0 'Hara X X X X 11Jayne Hays X X X X 
Sam Gibbons .X X X X X X X 
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